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ABSTRACT 
 
HOW PERCEPTION OF DECISION ENVIRONMENT AND FUTURE 
INFORMATION EFFECTS CHANGES IN DELAY DISCOUNTING RATES: 
DIFFERENCES ACROSS U.S. AND CHINA, DIFFERENCES BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE U.S. 2018 MIDTERM ELECTIONS 
 
SEPTEMBER  2019 
 
FRANCESCA WALSH, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Youngbin Kwak, Ph. D 
 
In this thesis, I will explore the idea that choices between present, smaller 
value options and future, larger value options depend on how much individuals 
trust the future to deliver the reward. Due to this aspect of trust, the individual 
must build their estimate of trust based on information for their present 
environment and their future expectations. This estimate of future trust can 
change across different time points in the same environment (i.e., before and 
after a national election) and between environments in the same time point (i.e., 
between two countries experiencing different economic rates of change). In this 
set of presented experiments, I will explore the link between decision 
environment and delay discounting, as well as the relationship between the 
contents of future perception and delay discounting. These two experiments will 
test differences in delay discounting (a) across two economic systems (China 
and the U.S.), as well as (b) before and after a national election (2018 U.S. 
Midterms). The results of the different economic environments study show that 
the delay discounting rates are significantly different across the two countries, 
specifically within the framing of present and future. These differences are not 
explained by differences in culture effects or individual differences in personality 
traits, suggesting that difference in environment is driving the effect. The results 
from the Midterm election experiments show evidence for differences in delay 
discounting between political identities and income groups. There are also 
differences in how these two groups perceive the future will be before and after 
the election. Overall, these experiments show that delay discounting can be 
affected by the way information is framed within an environment and how we 
expect our environments to change over time.  
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CHAPTER 1 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 
 
1. 1 Delay Discounting Overview 
Everyday decisions pass by us without feeling monumental or important at 
the time, such as the choice to eat lunch now or later. However, even this small 
choice requires knowledge of food availability, future commitments, and the 
necessity of the meal. Together information converges into the binary choice of 
“eat” or “not eat” and you move on with your day. Other choices are much more 
significant and take more cognitive effort, such as the decision between using 
$1000 to create a stock portfolio or using it to take a vacation. 
 More complex decisions like this one require deeper consideration into 
the immediate value of the vacation against the long term pay-off of investing in 
the stock market. Additionally, this trade-off decision will also require knowledge 
about the future prospects of the stock market and the overall trends of the 
economy, or the expected future value of the stock portfolio that can be weighed 
against the joy and subjective value of a vacation. You may also consider the joy 
you’ve felt on previous vacations against the anxiety you feel about potentially 
losing invested money. After considering these two choices, your prior 
experiences, and your future expectations a final decision will be made.  
As humans, we have cognitive limits on our strategic decision-making and 
must use limited information to make inferences and decisions about the future. 
(Simon, 1954). Our inferences and predictions are formed from observations and 
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judgements of the world around us. But what happens when we think the future 
will be worse than the present? How does the exposure to uncertainty and 
negative future prospects effect our present decision making? Is it more rational 
to choose smaller, immediate rewards over larger rewards in the future if we 
think the future will be worse than the present? When making a choice between 
two options, how do your prior experience and future expectations affect the 
decision? How much impact does your environment, or changes in your 
environment have on these decisions? This master’s thesis focuses on these 
questions while investigating the role of future expectations and different decision 
environments in decision-making. To do test for these differences, I will compare 
delay discounting rates calculated from a series of trade-off choices between 
small options in the present or larger options in the future. These tasks provide a 
good metric for testing trade-off choices that differ in temporal and valence 
domain.  
Delay discounting refers to how rewards retain value through time. It is the 
concept that time itself has a value which can mitigate an object’s financial value 
(for a review, see Teuscher & Mitchell, 2011). Similar temporal value calculations 
are also used in finance to assess present value and future value of assets in a 
firm or for investment value calculations. Delay discounting rates are modeled 
using an exponential or hyperbolic decay function (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996), 
where the delay discounting rate is the slope of the function. In these models, the 
delay discounting rate measures how quickly a reward decays in value over time; 
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such that, people with higher delay discounting rates are considered to be more 
impulsive because the present value of an object decays at a faster rate for these 
individuals. 
Across the literature, many researchers have considered delay 
discounting rates as an individual trait in their tasks (for a metanalysis, see 
Odum, 2011). Delay discounting has been frequently used to study differences in 
impulsive populations compared to control populations such as people who suffer 
from drug addictions, ADHD patients, smokers, and obese individuals (Bickel et. 
al, 1999; Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Weller et. al, 2008; Barkley et. al, 2001). These 
studies specifically focus on the implications delay discounting rates can have on 
daily decision making.  
While some studies examined how delay discounting can change within 
individuals primed with different mood states (Lampert et. al, 2016; Walsh, 2017; 
Calluso et. al, 2019), this current set of experiments will be one of the first to that 
show that delay discounting rates are not constant within individuals and that 
delay discounting rates can be affected by priming about the future, as well as 
changes in present environment.  
 
1.2 Models of Delay Discounting  
The first model of intertemporal choice comes from the work of 
economists in the 1930s. Traditionally, economists use an exponential model to 
predict inter-temporal decisions. These models traditionally use the formula: V= 
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Aek*D, where V= Future Value, A = Present Value, and D= Delay Length.  In this 
model, the k-value represents the risk associated with waiting for the reward in 
the future, also known as the constant hazard rate (Samuelson, 1937).  
However, in the 1990s the hyperbolic model became the primary model of 
intertemporal choice due to Green and Myerson’s work. In this hyperbolic 
formula, the k value represents the rate that a reward decays in value over time, 
instead of a measurement of risk. Using the formula, V=A/(1+k*D), Green and 
Myerson have repeatedly demonstrated that estimating the k value using a 
hyperbolic formula best fits and predicts experimental intertemporal data (Green, 
Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Green & Myerson, 1996; Myerson & Green, 1995; Kirby & 
Marakovic, 1995).  Another benefit of this model is that there can be an 
interpretation of the probability choice, when considering that V= A*P, and P = (1/ 
1+k*D) (Green & Myerson, 1996, p. 497). In the experiments, 
 I will calculate the delay discounting rates using a hyperbolic model. I 
chose a hyperbolic model because it has repeatedly been shown to be internally 
consistent and accurately fit intertemporal choice data. Specifically, the estimates 
of k are constant across groups and within individuals using this model. Such 
that, if k values increase or decrease due to experimental manipulation, it can be 
trusted that the differences observed are due to experimental manipulations and 
not fluctuations in the model reliability.  
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1.3 Impact of Trust on Delay Discounting  
 
The most famous experimental observation of delay discounting is the 
Marshmallow Experiment (Miscel et. al, 1972). In this experiment, children were 
given a marshmallow and told they could eat the one marshmallow now or wait 
for a second marshmallow when the researcher returned. This original 
experiment looked for the age where a child learns that if he delayed his want for 
something in the present, then he would receive a larger reward in the future. 
However, this experiment assumes that the child trusts the researcher to bring 
the second marshmallow. A follow-up study by Kidd et. al (2013) followed up on 
this question to see what happens then the researcher violates the trust of the 
child.  
 In this experiment, preschoolers ages 3-5 conducted the Marshmallow 
Experiment with one specific paradigm difference. Prior to the Marshmallow 
Experiment task, the child was given an art project to complete. For all 
participants, the experimenter told them that she would go get them a larger art 
set to use for the project. Next, half of the participants received the art set, while 
the other half of participants did not. When completing the marshmallow mask, 
children who received the art set were more likely to wait for the second 
marshmallow than children who did not receive the art set (Kidd et. al, 2013). 
This experiment provides evidence that our expectations of promises being 
fulfilled will influence delay discounting. Further providing evidence that people 
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incorporate their expectations about future behavior when choosing between 
options in the present and the future,  
Another experiment specifically tested the role of social trust and delay 
discounting. In this experiment, the authors tested if the trustworthiness of the 
agent offering the reward in the future affected the participants’ choice to pick the 
option in the present of the future. To do this, participants were given vignettes 
about three different agents which were written to seem untrustworthy, neutral, or 
trustworthy. After reading the vignettes, participants were given delay discounting 
choices with the agents’ name inserted into the question to offer the future 
reward (i.e., would you prefer $10 today, or for *untrustworthy character* to give 
you $100 in three months). The experiment found that agents scored higher in 
trustworthiness increased the probability of the respondent waiting for a future 
monetary amount than agents scored lower in trustworthiness (Michaelson et. al, 
2013). This experiment shows that we also take into account the likelihood of the 
other actor’s expected behavior when we make decisions. Specifically, that we 
incorporate our trust and expectations in the choices of others when making 
intertemporal choices involves another person.  
A similar experiment by Michaelson et. al (2016) tested if pre-school 
children absorb information about a person’s trustworthiness when doing the 
marshmallow task. In this experiment, a child viewed an interaction between two 
adults worked on an art project together and then when one adult left the room, 
the other adult broke the project. When the first adult re-entered the room the 
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second adult either apologized for the accident (trustworthy condition) or lied 
about the accident (untrustworthy condition). After the child watched this 
interaction, the marshmallow task was completed with either the trustworthy or 
untrustworthy actor as the person promised to bring the second marshmallow. 
Children with the unworthy adult ate the marshmallow three times faster than 
children with the trustworthy adult. Only 18% of children in the untrustworthy 
condition waited for the second marshmallow comparted to 59% of children in the 
trustworthy condition. This experiment shows that delaying gratification depends 
on our perception of other’s trustworthiness and our prediction of their behavior 
toward us. Additionally, this role of trust in trade-off decision making presents 
very early in cognitive development.  
Overall, these experiments probed at the role of social trust and our 
expectations about a person’s future behavior in our decision making. These 
experiments repeatedly show that people incorporate information about the 
actions of others into their decisions, and that this prediction of other’s behavior 
begins very early in cognitive development. Specifically, that people are less 
likely to trust others if there is evidence of the other person violating trust. This 
witnessed violation of trust repeatedly leads to someone choosing the smaller 
present option over the larger future option. This research lends to my central 
inference that if we absorb information about the trustworthiness of actors in our 
decision environment, we are also absorbing information about the 
trustworthiness of social institutions built by these actors. Such that, if we don’t 
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trust our social institutions or leaders, we are going to be less likely to rely on 
them to deliver larger rewards in the future, leading us to pick smaller options in 
the present.  
 
1.4  How Resource Scarcity Affects Myopic Decision-Making 
Resource scarcity is a term used frequently in both economics and 
biology. Overall, the term is used to mean the same thing: there is a limited 
supply of an object within a contained environment. In biology, resource scarcity 
is often used to measure animal foraging behavior for food or shelter. In 
economics, resource scarcity is used to explain many topics involving limited 
products or services in the market space. In general, the two disciplines use 
resource scarcity to observe how decision-making behavior changes across 
resource abundant or resource scarce environments.  
In order to explain why those experiencing high levels of resource scarcity 
tend to make myopic choices involving limited resources, Shah, Mullainathan, 
and Shafir (2012) proposed that the environment caused by resource scarcity 
“will create a tendency to borrow, with insufficient attention to whether the 
benefits outweigh the costs” (Shah et. al, 2012, p. 683). To test this theory, the 
researchers ran a series of experiments that utilized popular turn-based game 
paradigms which could manipulate the participants’ access to the number of 
turns. Their central claim is supported by the experimental finding that the 
resource scarcity group (low turn availability) showed increases attention during 
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Wheel of Fortune task, where participants have to guess missing letters to 
complete a well-known word or phrase, relative to the resource abundant group 
(high turn availability). Followed by the finding that resource scarce individuals 
with the ability to borrow extra turns during a similar game over-borrowed and 
perform much worse in the game compared to resource scarce individuals with a 
fixed set of turns. This effect of resource-scarce individuals over-borrowing and 
performing worse in a task was repeatedly observed across four other games 
(Shah et. al, 2012). Overall, this study shows clear behavioral evidence of how 
resource scarcity can lead to increased myopic and disadvantageous decision-
making within individuals. For reviews on how poverty changes decision-making 
and risk preferences, see Shafir (2017) and Kish-Gephart (2017).  
A new biological model has been proposed to address how resource 
scarcity effects the behavior and neurobiology of animals experiencing harsh 
environments. The Incentive Hope Hypothesis is a theory of animal motivation 
put forward by Anselme and Güntürkün (2018). The Incentive Hope Hypothesis 
describes how animals interact with limited resources in their environment and is 
different from previous theories on this topic such as Predictive Error theory put 
forward by Wolfram Schultz (for current opinion on topic, see Schultz ,2017). The 
Incentive Hope Hypothesis models the relationship between animals who 
experience harsh environments and their differences in foraging behavior relative 
to animals who experience abundant environments. Animals who experience 
high levels of uncertainty within harsh environments form expectations about 
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what the future will be, and are more likely to take immediate, smaller options 
compared to animals in less harsh environments. Animals in less harsh 
environments are more likely to explore more territory and turn down smaller 
options in the present for the opportunity to have a larger reward in the future. 
Both of these animals interact with their environments based on their previous 
experience and their future expectations of their reward likelihood and the 
relative risk of saying “no” to the present option. Specifically, this theory claims 
that harsh environments have the repeated effect that, “experiencing uncertainty 
or unpredictability results in the individual’s inability to predict whether the next 
foraging trial in a given environment will be rewards or not” (Anselme & 
Güntürkün, 2018, p. 5) which causes the animal to routinely take the present 
option over the risk of a larger option in the future. This model also connects 
neurobiological evidence for changes in the reward circuitry between animals of 
the same species who live in harsh environments relative to animals who live in 
abundant environments. Humans in harsh and uncertain environments have also 
been shown to exhibit similar behaviors to those described in the Incentive Hope 
Hypothesis (Walsh et. al, 2019). Specifically, it has been repeatedly observed 
that obesity levels follow track socio-economic status (SES) (Fredrick et. al, 
2014; Crandell & Temple 2018; for a review see Monterio et. al, 2004) and 
appetite research has linked SES and perceived social status to appetite 
regulation (Cheon & Hong, 2017; Sim et. al, 2018).  
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In an experimental manipulation of subjective socioeconomic status, 
Cheon and Hong (2017) observed that calorie intake of participants significantly 
changed across the relative low SES group and the relative high SES group. In 
this experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a higher subjective SES 
group (where they were told to envision them interacting with someone in the 
lowest income bracket relative to themselves) or a lower subjective SES group 
(where they were told to envision them interacting with someone in the highest 
income bracket relative to themselves), followed by filling out a questionnaire of 
what they would like to eat at a lunch buffet.  In later experiments, this 
questionnaire was replaced with actual food the participant could choose to eat. 
For each participant, these food items were added together to get a measure of 
the total the kcal of energy the participant chose to consume. Across four 
studies, it was repeatedly found that lower subjective SES groups chose higher 
calorie items and had a larger overall appetite than the higher subjective SES 
groups (Cheon & Hong, 2017). This experiment shows that even subjective 
experience of resource scarcity relative to more resource abundant individuals 
results in higher calorie intake and appetite.  
Using a similar subjective status paradigm as the previous experiment, 
Sim et. al (2017) tested for increased ghrelin release, an orexigenic hormone 
specifically involved in controlling hunger, in lower subjective status participants. 
This follow-up experiment wanted to determine if ghrelin release is influenced by 
changes in social status, and if this increased release of ghrelin in low subjective 
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SES participants caused the previous finding of low subjective SES participants 
having increased appetite and calorie intake. To do this, the researchers took a 
baseline blood sample and appetite rating from the participants. Then the 
participant either completed a control task or a fake aptitude task designed to 
manipulate the participant into feeling that they were low-achieving relative to 
their peers. After the both groups completed their tasks, participants were 
presented with a milkshake. The participants’ blood was sampled before 
consuming the milkshake. Thirty minutes after consuming the milkshake, the 
blood and appetite ratings were re-sampled. Analysis showed that ghrelin 
concentration significantly spiked in low subjective status participants after 
completing the task and the levels stayed significant thirty minutes after the 
milkshake was consumed. The control group did not significantly change in 
ghrelin concentration from baseline to before milkshake but did decrease after 
the milkshake. This experiment is one of the first to show biological evidence of 
hunger hormones being influenced by external subjective social status, and that 
subjective social status significantly impacts appetite regulatory systems within 
the human body.  
While it has been repeatedly observed that resource scarcity and 
perceived social status influences decision-making in disadvantageous ways, 
there is also research on interventions that build generalized trust in 
impoverished communities can reduce overall rates of myopic decision-making 
(Jachimowicz et. al, 2017). The first finding of Jachimowicz et. al (2017) paper 
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showed that income is a significant predictor of level of generalized trust, such 
that higher income individuals have more generalized trust than lower income 
individuals. The second finding of this paper showed that personal financial need, 
not income level, predicted an intertemporal trade off of $100 or $150 in one 
year. As a solution to reducing this type of myopic decision-making, a two-year 
field intervention focused on building community trust was initiated in four rural 
Bangash districts. This intervention successfully increased general trust and lead 
to a reduction in myopic decision-making by increasing the amount of options 
chosen in the future over the present within these communities.  
Overall, these experiments show repeated evidence that relative socio-
economic status and level of resource scarcity will influence intertemporal trade-
off decisions. Such that individuals with higher resource scarcity are less likely to 
wait for a larger reward in the future, over a smaller option in the present. This 
behavior persists even when the long-term choice has a higher pay off than the 
present choice. This trade-off behavior is repeatedly seen in food choices within 
both the animal and human literature. Finally, interventions that build a sense of 
general trust can reduce this preference for short-term options over long-term 
options. Collectively, this research shows that the resource availability of the 
environment and the level of future trust about future access to resources 
significantly impact inter-temporal choice behavior.  
1.5 The How Framing Change Delay Discounting Rates 
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Since previous studies have shown that people incorporate the behavior 
of others and our economic environment when making intertemporal trade-offs. 
Different interactions with actors and the decision environment led to information 
being presented in different orders. So, the next question becomes how do these 
specific differences in information and order of presentation effect decision-
making? To test this question, tasks must utilize the “framing effect” to shift the 
participant’s decision environment perspective. The framing effect is the 
observation that changing the layout and presentation of information changes the 
decision made after processing the information. For example, asking if someone 
would “prefer $50 today or $75 in three months” results in a different answer than 
asking if someone would “prefer $75 in three months or $50 today”. The framing 
effect is part of the larger discovery of Prospect Theory and the asymmetry 
between gains and losses, or the difference in how people weigh gains and 
losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
In this thesis, I will focus on two types of framing: valence and temporal. 
Temporal framing will be used to shift the participant’s time perspective to focus 
on either the present or future. Valence framing will be used to shift the 
participant’s reward valence perspective to focus on either gains or losses. 
Valence framing has previously been studied as continuation of the work on 
asymmetry between gains and losses studies “the sign effect”, or the effect of 
reward valence (gain or loss) on delay discounting questions. The sign effect is 
the repeated finding that delay discounting rates are higher for gain domains and 
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lower for loss domains – showing that people prefer to get rewards in the present 
instead of the future and prefer to push losses to the future (Lowenstein &Thaler, 
1989; Thaler, 1981).  
While temporal framing is a newer topic that focuses on how delay 
discounting rates change when a participant focuses on different temporal 
horizons.  Changing the temporal order of options between receiving something 
now or in the future, compared to in the future or now also changes choice 
behavior. Participants will have lower delay discounting rates for options when 
anchored to the present and offered an amount in the future compared to the 
higher delay discounting rates seen when participants are anchored in the future 
and are offered something now (Appelt et. al, 2011, Weber et. al, 2007) 
There are real world changes in decision-behavior due to the framing 
effect. A high-impact example of the real-world effect of framing is the difference 
in organ donation levels across countries. The framing effect is found in the opt-
in vs. opt-out questions frequently used when enrolling organ donors at the DMV. 
It is repeatedly observed that countries with the highest rates of organ donation 
are the countries with questions that ask if the person would rather opt-out of 
organ donation (donation enrollment rates above 75%) compared to the 
countries that ask if the person would rather opt into organ donation (donation 
rates below 30%) (Willis & Quigley, 2014; Davidai et. al, 2012).  
Recently, there has been some neurobiological evidence to show that 
framing changes neurobiological responses to probabilistic reward tasks 
 16 
(Mooshagian et. al, 2014). In this experiment, researchers used transcranial 
magnetic (TMS) in human subjects to target the primary motor cortex (M1) during 
a probabilistic reward task with three levels of probability and two levels of 
uncertainty. There was no effect of uncertainty on motor evoked potentials (a 
measure of corticospinal neuron excitability) but motor evoked potential 
amplitudes increased during the “find” task frame and decreased during the 
“avoid” task frame. These results show that M1 is sensitive to framing of reward 
tasks and the activity differences reflect responses to reward probability rather 
than outcome uncertainty. 
 
1.6 Experimental Overview 
As shown in this literature review, there is converging evidence that 
decisions between accepting rewards now or waiting for a better reward in the 
future can be influenced by our future expectations. There is neurobiological 
evidence of environment shaping reward circuitry provided in the Incentive Hope 
Hypothesis. As well as significant behavioral evidence from the delay discounting 
and marshmallow task literature showing that people incorporate the 
expectations of another person’s behavior into their intertemporal choice. This 
converging evidence intertemporal choice being influenced by future 
expectations and perception of future environment provides a gap in the literature 
that can be filled with a model of how environment, the human brain, and 
intertemporal choices may be interacting. 
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In the following chapters, I will first test if there are differences in delay 
discounting across two separate decision environments (the United States and 
China). This experiment will utilize temporal and valence framing to test the 
difference it causes across two very different economic systems. Then I will test if 
delay discounting rates are different before and after the 2018 Midterm Elections, 
a major American socio-political event. These two experiments will investigate 
how the role of decision environments and large-scale changes in decision 
environment affect trade-off choices between small present options and larger 
future options. This experiment will investigate if there are overall differences 
before and after the election, as well as if different political parties and income 
groups have differing responses to the election results. The goal of this thesis is 
to study how the environment shapes and changes delay discounting decisions 
in order to understand how people incorporate future expectations of their 
decision-making.  This behavioral research will lay the groundwork for future 
neurobiological studies that will probe the underlying neural circuitry of these 
decision phenomenon.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC ENVIORNMENTS ON 
DELAY DISCOUNTING 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Many of our decisions must come from our current access to resources 
and how we expect the world to be down the road. For example – investing in 
your 20s is widely considered to be a sound financial decision because it gives 
you the longest time period to make up for market losses and profit from overall 
increases in market value and interest rates. However, if the young person 
doesn’t trust that he or she will receive an equal or greater reward over a period 
time, then there is a disincentive to invest. This questioning of investment 
profitability certainty comes from a person’s observations and research into the 
current markets, historic market trends, and the stability of the present economic 
institutions. If any of these institutions seem less likely to fulfill the promise of 
higher net value on an investment, the person will seek other financial 
alternatives.  
Another major component of economic environment is the relative 
distribution of wealth and economic inequalities within the country. Wealth 
inequality is calculated by comparing the wealth distribution of a country against 
a normal distribution. The difference between these two curves gives you a 
measure of the direction and amount of wealth inequality within a country.  In 
2014, economist Thomas Piketty found global wealth and income inequality 
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rates, specifically within the United States and Europe, are at levels last seen in 
1920s (Piketty, 2014). In February 2019, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research published updated measurements of U.S. wealth inequality with levels 
that show the rates are actually higher than originally estimated in 2014 
(Zucman, 2019). The soaring wealth inequality of the 1920s has been considered 
to be a contributing factor to the Great Depression (1929-1939). Economic 
inequality has also been associated with social maladies and public health 
concerns. A comprehensive epidemiology book, The Spirit Level: Why greater 
equality makes societies stronger, pursued this line of research and showed a 
repeated pattern of social maladies increasing as a function of income inequality. 
This research showed countries with the highest rates of crime, disease, and a 
number of social maladies (such as mental health and risky teen behavior) also 
had the highest rates of income inequality (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2014).   
Wealth and income inequality have been shown to specifically influence 
monetary decision making. In an experimental manipulation, participants’ 
awareness of higher levels of economic inequality resulted in more risky 
gambling and monetary decisions. For example, participants who were 
manipulated to think they were in the lowest income bracket in a highly unequal 
society were more willing to take on risky gambles in order to close the gap 
between themselves and the top income bracket. This amount of risk increased 
depending on the width of the participants’ perceived gap between themselves 
and the top income bracket. Showing that more perceived equality resulted in 
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less risk-taking behavior and more inequality results in more risk-taking behavior 
(Payne et. al, 2017).  
Responding to specific information (inflation rates) in the economic 
environment has been observed in an experimental setting. A delay discounting 
experiment exploring the role of interest rates in delay discounting choices found 
that participants were sensitive to increasing, neutral, and decreasing interest 
and inflation rates. Participants played a three investment games with thirty-six 
trials in each game. Each game had a different inflation rates, nominal interest 
rates, or combinations of the two to test real interest rates (real interest = nominal 
interest rate – expected inflation rate).  Researchers tested if delay discounting 
within a participant changed across the different interest rate conditions. 
Changes in the inflation rates caused higher delay discounting rates for 
inflationary trials, and lower delay discounting rates for deflationary trials. 
Nominal interest rates followed the same pattern, as well as combinations of 
interest rates and nominal rates (Kawashima, 2006).  
Based on these psychology studies and reports on economic metrics of 
different countries, I propose that: there will be differences in economic decision-
making between two different countries because the economic information and 
prospects are different across the two environments. This difference in 
environment and information will result in measurable differences in decision-
making. These measurable differences should appear when you test for 
preference in trade-off choices between smaller rewards in the present or larger 
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rewards in the future. Environmental information should also affect how a person 
interprets the framing of these trade-off decisions. 
China and the U.S. are very different economic systems, which makes 
them good options to use in order to determine if differences in decision 
environments result in differences delay discounting. In a global survey of 35 
countries, delay discounting rates were found to be higher in China than in the 
United States (Wang et. al, 2016).  One possible factor leading to China’s higher 
delay discounting rates is the unprecedented rate of economic and social change 
which has occurred in China over the last 30 years. This rate of change is 
incredibly rapid compared to the U.S.’s relatively stable economic and social 
growth rates over the same time period.  
If Chinese participants are incorporating this rapid sense of change into 
their daily decision making, they may prefer taking smaller options today over 
larger options in the future because the future holds more uncertainty and risk. If 
this incorporation of rate of change is occurring, it is expected that Chinese 
participants will have higher delay discounting rates (choose more smaller, 
present options) in both gain and loss domains in a choice titration experiment 
because they trust the present option more than the risk of taking the future 
option, even if the future option may be worth more in value. Specifically, I expect 
that these differences will be visible in both the present vs. future framing 
comparison and the gain vs. loss framing comparison, such that the Chinese 
participants will have a lower delay discounting rate for the future gain condition 
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(choosing to pick future options over present options)  than the present gain 
condition and Americans will have a more equal delay discounting rate for the 
present gain and future gain conditions due to their incorporation of a relatively 
stable rate of social and economic change.  
 To test how differing economic environment affects decision making, I will 
test the difference in the delay discounting rates between the United States and 
China using four choice titrations adapted from Applet et, al (2011). I will also test 
for the difference of the framing effect on delay discounting, which includes 
testing framing in the temporal and valence domains. Choice titration is this 
experiment’s method of determining a participant’s delay discounting rate. 
 Choice titrations are a method of determining where smaller amounts in 
the present are equal to larger amounts of money in the future. This is done by 
holding one amount constant and varying the second amount by a fixed amount 
in each trail. In this context, a trial is one question within a set of eleven 
questions (For details and methods of analysis, see Section 2.3.2.1). This 
experiment utilizes four choice titration conditions which test: gains framed in the 
present, gains framed in the future, losses framed in the present, and losses 
framed in the future. The titration trials are presented below. The italicized and 
underlined amount increased by $5 increments in each trial. All four conditions 
measure a difference between the present and future option of - $10 net loss to + 
$40 net gain. All trials are presented in the same order of lowest difference to 
highest difference in a fixed order. Please see Appendix A for the full paradigm.  
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Table 2.1: Example Choice Titrations conditions presented to participants.  
Present 
Gain 
Would you prefer $50 gift card today, or $70 gift card three 
months from now? 
Future 
Gain 
Would you prefer $70 gift card three months from now or a $50 
gift card today? 
Present 
Loss 
Would you prefer a $50 fine today or $70 fine three months from 
now? 
Future 
Loss 
Future Loss: Would you prefer $70 fine three months from now 
or a $50 fine today? 
 
Previous studies have shown that individuals discount the gains more than 
they discount losses in both the present and future (Thaler et. al, 1981; Appelt et. 
al, 2011). In this study, we want to examine if the amount of discounting gains 
and losses in the present and future changes across economic system. 
Economic systems refer to the overall structure, function, and efficiency of 
markets and industries within a contained limit. For the purpose of this 
discussion, economic systems will be confined to the economic institutions and 
market fluctuations of a specific country.   
In this experiment, I seek to understand how being in different countries, 
with different economic and political systems, affect choices across the temporal 
and valence domain. This experiment is a follows a line of previous financial 
research which shows delay discounting rates change across country (Wang et. 
al, 2016). In this experiment, I am testing if these country differences are affected 
by framing. Framing has previously been shown to influence delay discounting 
rates (Applet et. al 2011; Weber et, al, 2007; Lowenstein 1988). To do this, I will 
use four choice titrations set in different temporal (present framing vs. future 
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framing) and valence (gain framing vs. loss framing) domains to calculate group 
delay discounting rates, and test for differences by country. Additionally, I will 
also compare the degree of sign effect across the two cohorts.  I will also test if 
these country differences remain when controlling for differences in individual 
traits and cultural differences. I will use personality and culture scales to account 
and control for any differences that may be introduced by culture and individual 
differences to isolate the effect of different decision-making environments.  
2.2 Hypothesis and Predictions 
I hypothesize that a person’s country, representing differences in 
economic and social environments, will influence delay discounting rates 
because participants include environmental information in their expectations of 
the future. I predict that there will be significant differences in the mean delay 
discounting rates between the China and United States samples. This difference 
will be significant in all four of the domains (present frame, future frame, gain 
frame, loss frame). In the gain domain, I predict that the difference in delay 
discounting rates between the present and future frame for Chinese will be will 
be larger than the Americans, where  the difference in delay discounting rates 
between the present and future frame will be smaller. This difference in delay 
discounting will show that Chinese participants will be more sensitive to temporal 
framing than American participants.  In the loss domain, I predict that the both 
countries will prefer to push losses to the future, resulting in low delay 
discounting rates, and that this rate will be lower for future framed fines relative to 
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present framed fines, showing that participants are more willing to push fines to 
the future when the reference point is paying today. For all conditions, I predict 
China will have a higher delay discounting rates than the U.S. since this trend 
has been previously observed. Additionally, I am interested testing if these 
Country, Valence and Time effects remain when controlling for cultural 
differences and time perspective and impulsivity personality traits (ie, impulsivity, 
gambling tendencies). However, I predict that all three effects will remain 
significant after controlling for these factors because the difference in delay 
discounting is dependent on the different decision environments and not 
participant trait differences. 
 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Participants 
Overall, the total experimental sample is 606 participants (M = 19.12 yrs., 
SD= 1.35) (See Table 2.1). Participants who did not complete the survey were 
not included in data analysis. Participants were also excluded if their response in 
choice titrations showed non-logical shifts across time. For example, if a 
participant chose $50 today over $70 in three months, followed by $75 in three 
months over $50 today, and then went back to choosing $50 today over $80 in 
three months. This would show the participant did not reach a point where the 
option in the future was equal to the option in the present.  
Data was collected in the United States and the People’s Republic of 
China, The United States participants (n= 290, M = 20.00 yrs., SD = 1.25) were 
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University of Massachusetts Amherst students enrolled in an undergraduate 
psychology course at the university. The choice titration was administered in the 
U.S. as an online study via the UMass Amherst online experimental study 
recruitment board (SONA). Students who enrolled via SONA were given one 
extra credit in a psychology course for 30 minutes of their time. Participants who 
did not complete the survey were not included in data analysis. The Chinese 
participants (n = 316, M = 18.25 yrs., SD = 0.76) were first year Chinese National 
Science Academy psychology students. The choice titration was administered as 
part of their beginning of the semester survey packet. In both the US and 
Chinese sample, participants were given one of the four versions of the Choice 
Titration questionnaires for a between-subjects design (see section 2.3.2). Table 
2.1 shows participant information for each group and Choice Titration condition.  
Table 2.2: Participants in Chinese and United States Samples   
Choice Titration 
Group 
China n U.S. n China Mean 
Age 
U.S Mean 
Age 
Present Gain 116 67 18.2 19.9 
Future Gain 63 61 18.36 20.01 
Present Loss 71 83 18.07 20.01 
Future Loss 66 79 18.36 19.9 
Total 316 290 18.25 20.00 
 
2.3.2 Survey Design 
The survey included one of the four versions of Choice Titration 
questionnaires developed by Applet et al. 2011. Additionally, to determine the 
contribution of socio-cultural orientation and personality traits in delay discounting 
difference across the US and Chinese samples, we additionally included several 
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individual difference measures as described in detail below. After completing the 
survey measures, the participant was randomly assigned to one of the four 
choice titration conditions. This experiment used a between subject design, 
where each participant took one version of the choice titration, but all subjects 
responded to the same personality scales. All participants received choice 
titration items in the same order. 
2.3.2.1 Choice Titrations 
Choice titrations measure the decision point where the participant 
switches between picking options in the future to options in the present. This 
choice is the decision inflection point that represents the place in the temporal 
horizon where the option presented in the future is equal to the option in the 
present, and the participant can no longer justify picking the future option over 
the present option. I am using this measurement of delay discounting because it 
captures the specific point on the temporal horizon where two rewards are equal 
to one another. In this experiment, there are four choice titrations with 11 trials. 
Each trial moves in $5 increments from a -$10 net loss to a $40 net gain. All 
choices are given across a fixed time increment of three months. The gain 
domain titrations were framed as gift cards and loss domain titrations were 
framed as fines. Each condition had the gain or loss either accelerating toward 
(present) or away (future) from the participant (Adapted from Applet et. al, 2011).  
2.3.2.2 Measures of Socio-Cultural Orientation and Personality  
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In this experiment, while I generally hypothesize that the delay discounting 
rates will be different between the United States and China because the 
decision-environments of the counties are different, there are specific trait 
aspects that need to be taken into consideration during analysis. Tested for 
country overall could lead to confounds such as group differences in cultural 
beliefs of group differences in personality traits. To control for these cohort 
differences, scales that gather information in socio-cultural orientation and 
personality were included in the task. This information was collected through a 
series of trait questionnaires.  
To test cultural differences, the participants completed the Singelis Self 
Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994) which measures a participant’s Independence 
and Interdependence and the Asian Values Scale (Kim et. al, 2005) which 
measures how much the participant subscribes to Asian cultural values and 
social beliefs. These two scales give valuable information on differences in 
cultural beliefs across the two cohorts which could contribute to the effect of 
country in any statistical tests.  
To test for differences in trait impulsivity, the participants complete the 
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (Patton et. al, 1995) which measures a participant’s trait 
impulsiveness and Gambling Related Cognition Scale (Raylu & Oei, 2004) which 
measures a participant’s gambling and risk-taking tendencies. Together, these 
scales gather information about the participant’s opinion risk taking behavior and 
their trait impulsivity.  
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Finally, to test for differences in time perspective, participants compete the 
Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (Keough et. al,1999) which measures how 
much the participant thinks about the future and Future Orientation Scale 
(Steinberg et. al, 2009) which measures how much the participants envisions 
themselves in the future. Including these scales provides information about the 
participant’s consideration of time in their decision-making and how often they 
envision their future.  
Together, these scales provide information about the participants’ cultural 
beliefs, risk-taking behavior, and time perspective.  This information can be used 
to control for any differences between the cohorts that are derived from 
differences in cultural background or personality traits. All scales will be entered 
into a principle components analysis to be used as co-variates in later statistical 
tests.  
2.4 Analysis 
The delay discounting rates were calculated using the standard hyperbolic 
formula (V= future option value, A= present option value, k= discount rate, Delay 
Length= time in years that the second option is delayed). The delay discounting 
rate was calculated using values from the first trial when a participant chose the 
future option over the present option using EQ1. To keep comparisons standard 
across the different choice titration conditions, the difference between the 
constant amount and the variable amount was used to calculate the delay 
discounting rate. A sample calculation is shown below: 
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Delay discounting rate (k) was calculated using the above formula in the 
four Choice Titration versions. As this is a between-subjects design, there is only 
one delay discounting rate for each participant. Additionally, the four conditions 
were broken down into two between-subject fixed factors that could test for 
Temporal and Valence framing. To do this, a Time factor was created to code for 
Present Frame and Future Frame. This collapsed the Present Gain and Present 
Loss into one group, and Future Gain and Future Loss into a second group. 
Similarly, a Valence factor was created to code for Gain Frame and Loss Frame. 
This collapsed the Present Loss and Future Loss into one group, and Present 
Gain and Future Gain into a second group. These two between-subject factors 
were used into later statistical tests to test for differences in framing.  
The discount rate was first compared across the present vs. future (Time) 
and gain vs. loss (Valence) frames between the US and Chinese samples 
(Country), using a 2 Country (US vs. China) x 2 Time (present vs. future) x 2 
Valence (gain vs. loss) ANOVA using Country, Time and Valence as fixed 
factors. This was followed up by two 2 (Country: U.S., China) by 2 (Time: 
Present, Future) ANOVAs conducted separately in the Gain domain and the Loss 
domain.  An identical procedure was followed to test for differences in the 
Present and Future domain using a 2 (Country: U.S., China) by 2 (Valence: Gain, 
Loss) ANOVAs.  
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The contribution of socio-cultural orientation and personality traits was 
examined first by performing a principle component analysis on all of the survey 
measures excluding the Choice Titration questionnaire (i.e., AVS, ZTPI Future, 
BIS-11, FOS, GRCS, Interdependence, Independence) to isolate component 
associated with socio-cultural orientation or personality traits relevant to 
impulsive decision making. The two identified components were included as 
covariates in the ANOVA. Additionally, as the US and Chinese sample were 
different in age (t= -20.35, p= 0.000,  df= 471.528), we included age as a 
covariate in all our analyses.  
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Delay Discounting Differences Across U.S. and China 
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Figure 2.1: This figure shows the differences in the delay discounting means 
between China (left) and the U.S. (right). Both countries show an asymmetry of 
discounting in both aspects of the Valence domain (gift card and fine). Error bars 
represent SEM for each condition and group.  
 
First, I investigated the difference in delay discounting across Country, 
Time, and Valence. To do this, a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (Country: China, U.S.; Frame: 
Present, Future; Valence: Gain, Loss) on discounting rate (k value) was 
conducted, This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Valence 
(F(1,598)=104.466, p= 0.000), Time F(1,598)=268.017, p= 0.000), and Country 
F(1,598)=27.187, p= 0.000), an interaction between Valence and Time 
F(1,598)=744.385, p= 0.000), and a three-way interaction between Valence, 
Time, and Country F(1,598)=35.777, p= 0.000) (Figure 2.1 a-b).  
This three-way interaction shows that the delay discount rate was higher 
in China, for the present gain and the future fine frames. However, the U.S. and 
China did not have differences in delay discounting for the present fine and future 
gain frames. The Valence by Time interaction showed that the discount rate was 
higher in gift card conditions compared to fine conditions for options framed in 
the present, but the delay discounting rate for the fine condition was greater than 
the gift card condition for options framed in the future.  
2.5.2 Comparison of Temporal Framing Effect Across Country 
Next the three-way interaction was followed up to investigate the role of 
Country in the temporal and valence frame separately. First, I investigated the 
role of Country in the Temporal domain. To investigate the degree of temporal 
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Figure 2.2: This figure shows the countries’ mean delay discounting rates differ 
across the Temporal (A) and Valence (B) domain. Error bars represent SEM for 
each condition and group.  
 
Temporal Domain 
Valence Domain 
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framing, a 2 x 2 ANOVA (Country: China, U.S.; Time: Present, Future) was 
conducted for the Gain condition and the Loss condition separately (Please see 
Figure 2.2a).  
In the Gain domain, there was a significant main effect of Country (F 
(1,335) =28.332, p= 0.000)) and Time (F (1,335) =239.098, p= 0.000)). 
Additionally, the interaction between Country and Time (F (1,335) =35.340, p= 
0.000)) was significant. In the Loss domain, there is a significant main effect of 
Country (F (1, 264) = 6.482, p= 0.011) and Time (F (1, 264) =451.607, p=0.000). 
Additionally, the interaction between Country and Time (F (1, 264) =9.055, 
p=0.003) was significant. All main effects and interactions are significant in both 
domains, suggesting that the differences between time frames and within each 
country occur in both the gain and loss conditions. In both the gain and loss 
conditions, China has a significantly higher delay discounting rate for present 
gains and future losses.   
2.5.3  Comparison of Valence Framing Effect Across Country 
 
Next, to follow up the three-way Country, Time, and Valence interaction, I 
tested for differences in Valence and Country on delay discounting rates, two 2 x 
2 ANOVAs (Country: China, U.S.; Valence: Gain, Loss) were run separately for 
the Present and Future conditions (Please see Figure 2.2b). 
In the Present domain, there is a significant main effect of Country (F (1, 
335) =28.332, p =0.000) and Valence (F (1, 335) =239.098, p= 0.000). 
Additionally, the interaction between Country and Valence (F (1, 335) = 35.340, 
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p=0.000) is significant. In the Future domain, there is a significant main effect of 
Country (F (1, 264) = 6.482, p= 0.011) and Valence (F (1, 264) = 451.607, p= 
0.000), as well as a significant interaction between Country and Valence (F 
(1,264) =9.055, p= 0.003). All main effects and interactions are significant in both 
domains, suggesting that the differences between valence frames and within 
each country occur in both the present and future conditions. In both the present 
and future conditions, China has a significantly higher delay discounting rate for 
present gains and future losses.   
2.5.4 Specifying the Differences in Country Across the Four Choice 
Titrations 
We also compared the delay discounting rates of the two countries in each 
titration condition separately using two-sample t-tests. These independent t-tests 
revealed significant differences were found in the present gain (df = 180, t= 
7.692, p= 0.000) and future loss (df =143, t= 3.664, p= 0.00) conditions, but not 
in the future gain (df= 152, t= -0.343, p= 0.732) and present loss (df =97, t= 
0.234, p= 0.815) conditions. 
2.5.5 Using Factor Analysis to Create a Culture and Personality 
Measurement   
To determine the contribution of personality traits and socio-cultural 
orientations in delay discounting differences across U.S. and China, we first 
performed a Principle Component Analysis to collapse across the survey 
measures including the Asian Value Scale, ZTPI Future Subscale, BIS-11, 
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Future Orientation Scale, Gambling Related Cognition Scale, Interdependence, 
and Independence. First, we examined if factor analysis was suitable for the nine 
scales. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 6.26, which 
is far above the recommended value of 0.6, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
was significant χ2 (21) = 721.752, p < 0.000. Finally, the communalities for all 
items were above 0.3 (See Table 2.2). The result of the factor analysis indicated 
that a 2-factor solution was supported for our sample. The first and second 
component explained 29.77% and 24.033 % of the variance, respectively. This 
analysis explained 53.803% of the variance and had eigen values above 1.5, 
with other factors dipping under 0.8 (see Figure 2.3 for Scree Plot). All items 
pertaining to cultural differences loaded onto the first factor, and all items related 
to time personality loaded onto the second factor (see Table 2.3 for factor 
loadings). All factor loadings were above .3 with no cross-loading onto another 
factor. An independent t-test shows that China and the United States differ in 
means for Component 1 (Culture, t = 26.555, df = 597, p = 0.000) but not for 
Component 2 (Personality, t = 1.730, df = 597, p = 0.084). This shows that the 
Culture Component is significantly different across the two countries, but the 
Personality Component is not. The two component scores were included as 
covariates in the previously tested 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (Country: China, U.S.; 
Frame: Present, Future; Valence: Gain, Loss) in delay discounting to determine 
their contributions.   
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Table 2.3: Factor loadings and communalities based on a maximum likelihood 
analysis with varimax rotation for 6 personality scale scores  
 
Factors Component 
1: Culture  
Component 2: 
Time 
Personality 
Asian Value Scale 0.869  
ZTPI Future Sub-score 0.811  
BIS- II  0.822 
Future Orientation Scale  -0.738 
Gambling Related 
Cogitation Scale  
 0.540 
Interdependence  0.743  
Independence   -0.346 
Eigen Value  2.056 1.682 
Variance Accounted 29.77 % 24.033 % 
Note. Factor loadings < 0.3 are suppressed 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Above is the Scree Plot of Factor Analysis displaying the Eigenvalues 
of the components. Components one and two are used as factors in follow-up 
analyses. 
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2.5.6 Including Culture and Time Personality Factors in Delay Discounting 
Differences in Present and Future Frames across Country 
  
Figure 2.4: This figure shows the 2 (Country: U.S., China) by 2 (Time: Present, 
Future) by 2(Valence: Gain, Loss) ANOVA with the Culture and Personality Trait 
factors from the Principal Component Analysis included as co-variates.   
 
 The 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (Country: China, U.S.; Frame: Present, Future; 
Valence: Gain, Loss) on the delay discounting rate including the Culture factor 
and Personality factor from the PCA as covariates still showed a main effect of 
Country (F(1,598)=11.924, p=0.001), Time (F(1,598)=97.770, p=0.000) and 
Valence (F(1,598)=268.247 p=0.000), with a two-way interaction of Time and 
Valence (F(1,598)=720.448, p=0.000), and a three-way interaction of Country, 
Time, and Valence  (F(1,598)=32.091, p=0.000). Culture or Personality are not 
significant co-variates. Interactions between Country and Time or Valence is also 
not significant. The R-Squared of this ANOVA is 0.660 and the adjusted R-
Squared is 0.655. 
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 This non-significance of the Culture and Personality factors a covariate 
demonstrates that the three-way interaction of Country, Time, and Valence is not 
dependent on personal cultural or time personality traits. This finding lends 
further evidence to the hypothesis that delay discounting differences are 
influenced differences in decision environments and not individual differences in 
personality traits or socio-cultural orientation.  
 
2.6 Discussion 
The current study showed the following main findings: 1) differences in 
delay discounting by Country 2) differences by Country across the Temporal 
frame, 3) differences by Country across the Valence frame, and 4) these findings 
remained significant when controlling for individual differences in socio-cultural 
orientation and time perspective.  In this experiment, the results show a repeated 
finding that the mean delay discounting rates are significantly different between 
the two Countries, specifically within the present gain condition and future loss 
condition. Additionally, the sign effect (Thaler et. al, 1981; Applet et. al, 2011) 
was replicated, and the degree of this sign effect is significantly different across 
the two countries. All of these differences in mean delay discounting rates remain 
significant after controlling for age, cultural differences and personal trait 
differences, suggesting that the effect of country is driving this effect 
These differences in delay discounting across country suggest that 
temporal-based reward decisions are made differently across countries with 
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different economic and social environments. For the gain domain, the Chinese 
participants were more impulsive (M= 2.1) than the American participants (M= 
0.7) for the present priming condition (“Would you prefer a fixed amount ($50) 
today or a variable amount in the future ([$40-$90])?”). Both countries treat gains 
in the future with the same delay discounting rate (China: M= 0.18, USA: M= 
0.19), showing that both groups are more willing to wait for a future reward when 
the choice starting point is set in the future. For the loss domain, the U.S. and 
Chinese participants have the same delay discounting rate for fines framed in the 
present (China: M=0.7, USA=0.66). (Would you prefer a fixed fine today ($45) or 
a variable amount fine ([$35, $85]) three months from now?). The Chinese and 
American participants had different delay discounting rates for fines framed in the 
future (Would you prefer a variable amount fine ([$35, $85]) three months from 
now or fixed fine ($45) today?). Americans had a lower delay discounting rate 
(M= 3.13) for future fines compared to the Chinese (M= 3.9). This suggests that 
Chinese participants would rather pay off debt sooner than American participants 
when the choice starting point is set in the future. This increase in Chinese delay 
discounting rates may reflect incorporation of knowledge about the rapidly rising 
inflation rates and currently fluctuations which would cause debts to be higher 
cost in the future.  
The role of rate of growth could be driving these changes in decision-
environment which is reflected in the differences in delay discounting rates. For 
instance, the Chinese economy has maintained 10% GDP average growth rate 
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over the last ten years (The World Bank, accessed 10/15/2018), while the United 
States has maintained a 2-3% GDP growth rate (The World Bank, accessed 
10/15/2018). Additionally, the Chinese industries have experienced tremendous 
growth over the past decade which has resulted in higher average disposable 
incomes and more access to commercial products (Fung et. al, 2010; Bingxi & 
Lijuan, 2009; Meng 2004; Farrell et. al, 2006). This is in contrast to the U.S., 
which has maintained a constant rate of growth over the past 20 years (FRED, 
accessed 10/15/2019) and experienced a severe economic recession from 2008 
to 2013.              
Overall, this experiment provides significant evidence for differences in 
delay discounting rates across two very different economic systems.  These 
differences in delay discounting are most sharply observed for present gain and 
future loss conditions, suggesting, that these choices are most effected by 
temporal and valence framing. This effect of framing may be evoking different 
future prospects and expectations about the future environment, which results in 
a difference in inter-temporal choice across the two countries. Further cross-
cultural research is needed to identify what differences in neural circuitry 
activation is causing this difference. As well as if these effects can be predicted 
by public economic information on inflation and GDP/capita growth rates. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPARING DELAY DISCOUNTING BEFORE AND AFTER A MAJOR 
SOCIOPOLITICAL EVENT 
3.1 Literature Review 
In a democratic republic like the United States, politicians and political 
parties have tremendous power to shape the social, cultural, and economic 
environment of the country. This influence is executed via their power to create, 
amend, and end public policies; appoint judges, agency executives, and cabinet 
officials; as well as influence social and cultural narratives with their campaigns 
and public speeches.  Since all political actions require majority vote to pass, the 
two major parties (Democrats and Republicans) need to ensure congressional 
majorities to pass their agendas. This need for a majority makes U.S. Elections 
integral to both the short-term and long-term direction of future environment of 
U.S. Elections happen every two years for various positions. The most recent 
elections are the 2016 Presidential Election, the 2018 Midterm Elections, and the 
upcoming 2020 Presidential Election.  
The 2018 U.S. Midterm Elections had the highest voter turn-out in over 
100 years with just over 49% of the country voting (AP News). In the months 
leading up to the elections, cable news channels made Midterm Elections 
coverage a constant media spectacle. Including a live non-stop coverage of 
Election Day on major news channels, a decision typically used only for 
Presidential Elections (for a detailed review of how each outlet covered the 
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election, see the “Here’s How TV, Digital News Outlets Are Covering Midterm 
Elections Day”, AdWeek). A day prior FiveThirtyEight published a viewing 
schedule of when the polls would close, and MSNBC even used their access to 
Rockefeller Plaza to project the election results on the ice rink (CCN).  This 
increased attention and social weight given to the 2018 Midterm Elections made 
the event a good socio-political event to use in this experiment. Additionally, the 
smaller scale of this set of elections makes it an ideal way to attain pilot data and 
see if this experiment should be re-run during the 2020 Presidential Campaign 
and Election.  
There is previous literature showing that humans have neurobiological 
responses to American elections. In 2008, researchers from Duke University and 
University of Michigan took four cortisol samples on the night of the 2008 
Presidential Election, once before, once during the results announcement and 
two after the results were announced. The results showed a significant increase 
in cortisol levels for Senator McCain voters and a significant decrease in cortisol 
levels for President Obama voters after the announcement (Stanton et. al, 2009). 
These results show that McCain voters had an increased stress response 
compared to Obama voters after the election results, providing evidence that 
socio-political events can have a significant effect on the human stress response.  
Additionally, a study from UCLA showed that participants experiencing 
election-related distress and depression in the four months after the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election showed differences in stress-related reward processing 
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compared to participants who did not experience distress (Tashjian & Galvan, 
2018). This fMRI paradigm investigated the mesolimbic reward circuit, focusing 
on the NAcc and mPFC, and the circuit’s response to reward anticipation and 
loss. Activation in the NAcc was shown to significantly moderated the relationship 
between depression and the election stress. Overall, the study showed that 
political events can significantly affect the mesolimbic circuit and cause 
differences in reward and loss processing. 
In this experiment, I will be testing delay discounting rates before and after 
the 2018 Midterm election to examine how an external change in the socio-
economic environment effects changes in intertemporal choices. I will also test if 
these differences before and after the election group are specific to certain 
political identities and income groups. I expect that the outcome of the Midterm 
Election will change participants’ perception of future perspective due to the 
change in administration. This difference in future perception will create changes 
in an individual’s thoughts about their future as well as their measures of delay 
discounting. I expect that these effects of election will be modulated by an 
individual’s political and economic standing within their current decision 
environment.  
There are no experiments looking at the relationship between trust in 
political institutions and changes in delay discounting. However, it follows similar 
logic to the previous chapter’s economic uncertainty argument that political 
uncertainty would also result in changes to monetary decision making. Since all 
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global markets rely on the decisions of political institutions to set the rules and 
intervene during bad economic times, it makes sense that having trustworthy and 
dependable leaders making these decisions will influence economic decisions.  
This set of experiments is aimed at determining the link between political change 
to changes in delay discounting.   Such that, the losing political identity should 
increase (become more impulsive) and the winning political identity should 
decrease (become less impulsive) after the set of elections. 
Another aspect of the environment closely associated with the income 
level is the amount of access you have to environmental resources. This level of 
resource scarcity in an environment can be measured in current socio-economic 
status and the socio-economic status a person experiences growing up. There is 
significant evidence showing that lower socioeconomic status individuals have 
higher delay discounting rates and lower risk tolerances than higher 
socioeconomic status individuals (again, for a review please see Shafir (2017) 
and Kish-Gephart (2017)). As well as evidence that exposure to high levels of 
economic uncertainty during childhood, such as growing up during the Great 
Depression, shapes life-long financial risk tolerances to be more conservative 
and myopic (Malmendier & Nagel, 2009).  This effect of environment and 
resource scarcity influencing myopic decision making has been previously 
discussed in Section 1.4.  
In this experiment, I will investigate if the effects of the Midterm Election 
across socioeconomic status. As delay discounting differ across and can be 
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affected by economic status, it is also plausible that the different socioeconomic 
groups will be affected by the Midterm Election separately. Specifically, that the 
higher income individuals  will be more affected by the election and the effect the 
election has on future prospects because higher income individuals  show higher 
generalized trust and reliance on the future than lower income individuals.  
In this experiment, I first collected the participant’s baseline delay 
discounting rates as well as survey items that gathered information on their 
demographics, perception of risk in the world around them, and how they interact 
with actors within their environment. Next, to test if self-projection into the future 
changes delay discounting rates, I had participants think towards their future and 
write a brief paragraph describing the future they envisioned 10 years from now. 
After this projection, the delay discounting rate was collected again.  This 
projection procedure was used to prime the participants to envision their future 
before having them make a series of intertemporal choices. The difference in 
delay discounting rate between the two time points were compared by Election 
Group (Before and After) , the political parties and income levels. We also 
analyzed the specific contents of the paragraphs provided by the participants to 
measure qualitative and quantitative differences in valence of the participant’s 
future perspective.    
I anticipate that the direction of delay discounting change, if it occurs, will 
follow political party identity and the outcome of the election. For example, if 
you’re very liberal and very dissatisfied with the current conservative 
 47 
government, you will have greater increase in delay discounting from baseline, 
compared to conservatives, when projecting towards the future before the 2018 
Midterm. After the midterm election, if the liberal party wins control of one or both 
of the houses of congress, the liberals’ delay discounting rates would show 
greater decrease from baseline, compared to conservatives, when projecting 
towards the future.   
Additionally, I anticipate that the direction of delay discounting change, if it 
occurs, will follow income groups and the outcome of the election, with the upper 
middle- and upper-class groups being more sensitive to changes in future 
perspective. These groups will have higher sensitivity to these election results 
and their implications for the future perspective due to the higher levels of 
general trust and future orientation that exist in higher income individuals.   
3.2 Hypothesis and Predictions 
I hypothesize that the groups tested before and after the 2018 Midterm 
Elections will have different delay discounting rates because the sociopolitical 
environment will have changed, which creates different perspectives on one’s 
future. I predict that the differences in delay discounting rates will depend on the 
outcome of the elections, the way in individual perceived one’s future in 
reference to the election outcomes, their political party, income group, and level 
of concern about the future direction of the country. Overall, predict that if a 
participant envisions a more negative future, their delay discounting rate will 
increase due to them becoming more myopic. My political identity group 
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prediction is that participants’ delay discounting rates will increase (become more 
impulsive and myopic) if their political party loses and decrease if their political 
party wins. My income group prediction is that there will be differences in delay 
discounting rates across income level, with higher incomes showing more 
change due to their increased freedom and access to resources. In this line, I 
hypothesize that lower income individuals will be less effected by the Midterm 
Elections because lower income groups are less reliant on the future when 
making inter-temporal choices. Overall, I am also aware that these effects could 
be more muted than results seen in a Presidential campaign because the 
Midterm Elections are an aggregation of hundreds of events, while the 
Presidential election is a stochastic event. 
As a way of measuring how one’s future is envisioned, individuals were 
asked to project toward their future and write a brief paragraph describing it. If 
present environment informs future projections, the normalized negative thought 
ratio should be lower for Post-Midterm participants than Pre-Midterm participants 
(less dominated by negative thoughts), assuming that the U.S. Midterm Election 
outcome makes the participants feel more positive about the present. This 
difference in normalized negative thoughts should also follow a political party 
identity pattern.  Overall, the k differences for each k level should be predicted by 
normalized negative thought ratios for future projection. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
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Undergraduate students were recruited through SONA, the UMass 
Amherst research participation platform (N=270, M= 20.01, males =53). 
Participants who fully completed the survey were granted one SONA credit, and 
participants who did not finish were not granted credit. The Pre-Midterm Election 
survey (n= 105, M = 20.05, males = 17) was posted to the SONA system via 
Qualtrics two weeks before election day. The Post- Midterm Election survey (n = 
165, M =19.98, males = 53) was posted to the system one week after the 2018 
Midterm Elections and remained open for two weeks.  
Participants were enrolled in the study based on their date of sign-up and 
had access to the survey for 5 days after the link was opened. Once this deadline 
passed, the survey link expired and Qualtrics submitted the latest version of the 
survey. No participants were allowed to take both the Pre-Midterm and Post-
Midterm surveys and no participants were directed to take a specific survey. The 
overall completion rate was 89.3% of participants. The Pre-Midterm survey 
enrolled 105 participants, with 95 participants completing the survey (90.5% 
completion rate) and the Post Midterm survey enrolled 165 participants, with 146 
participants completing the survey (88.5% retention rate).  
Participants were included for analysis if their delay discounting rate was 
internally consistent (a measurement in Kaplan Auto-scorer, 2016), provided the 
written priming paragraphs with valid, consistent responses, and finished the 
survey. A valid and consistent priming response was judged by undergraduate 
research assistants who assessed if the participant legitimately responded to the 
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prompt and did not input random words or characters to meet the character limit. 
The scoring methods for this analysis is described in the next Section (Section 
3.3.2). When these filters were applied, this further excluded 15 participants (7 
from Pre-Midterm group and 8 from Post-Midterm group) to create the final 
groups of Pre-Midterm (n=88, M= 20.07 yrs, SD= 2.201, males= 13) and Post-
Midterm (n=138, M=20.12 yrs, SD= 1.178,  males= 34) participants. The final 
sample size is (N= 226, M= 20.10 yrs, SD= 1.65, males = 47). The political and 
economic breakdown of the sample is shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: Sample Sizes of Sample, Political Groups, and Income Groups  
 Pre-Midterm (n) Post-Midterm (n) Total  
Liberal 45 77 122 
A Mix 21 34 55 
Conservative 5 4 9 
No Party 17 23 40 
Lower Class 15 18 33 
Lower Middle Class 26 31 57 
Upper Middle Class 33 62 95 
Upper Class 14 27 41 
Total 88 138 226 
 
3.3.2 Survey Design 
Both surveys had the same layout and order of questions, but the Post-
Midterm survey included three additional questions on opinions about the 
elections and voting behavior. The survey began with a consent form, 
demographic questions (age, gender, hometown, employment, education level), 
and economic backgrounds questions to attain socio-economic status. Next, the 
political identity questions were taken from PEW research (Pew Research 
Center, 2014) questionnaires covering political identity, changes in political 
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interest, and level of political interest. Then the participant completed the 27-item 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire, a survey item with twenty -seven intertemporal 
choices with varying lengths of time and reward differences, which  measures 
delay discounting (Kirby et. al, 1999), Consideration of Future Consequences 
Scale (Strathman et. al, 1994) which measures how the participant considers 
future consequences of present actions, and the Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS-
11) (Patten et. al, 1995) which measures trait impulsivity. Participants were then 
asked to rate how fast they felt the world was moving 10 years ago, and how fast 
the world feels like it’s moving now (negative or positive on a continuous sliding 
scale between 0 and 100), as well as what direction the world has changed over 
the past five years. This section was followed by PEW questions on trust in 
others, trust in leaders, in-group feeling, and general concerns for the future 
(Pew Research Center, 2017). Finally, for the Post-Midterm survey, there were 
questions regarding the outcomes of Midterm Election, then on both surveys 
there was the priming task, in which participant are asked to provide written 
responses as described in detail below. After the priming task, the participants 
re-took the 27- item Monetary Choice questionnaire. 
The priming task consisted of two sequential writing prompts that each 
required 1000-character responses (about 5 to 7 sentences). The first prompt 
asked the participant to consider the world around them in present and to include 
any significant events that had happened in their day or week. The second 
prompt asked the participant to consider the world 10 years from now and 
 52 
explain what they saw happening around them in terms of economic, political, 
environmental, and social future. For the post-midterm survey, the second 
prompt used the same language, but specified that participants should 
incorporate the outcome of the 2018 Midterm U.S. Elections as he or she 
projected into the future.  
 We used the priming task as a procedure to prime the participants to think 
about their expectations and the contents of the future. This projection was 
analyzed to see if the participant intrinsically projected to a positive or negative 
future, as well to what degree their future had a particular valence (ie, strongly 
negative, strongly positive, neutral, weakly positive, weakly negative). The 
specific contents of the participants’ thoughts about the future were used a metric 
about the participant’s expectations of their future environment (scoring and 
calculations are described in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). 
3.3.3 Group Specifications 
Political Identity and Income classes are the two participant groups that 
are used in this analysis. The Political identities are Liberal, A Mix, Conservative 
and No Party. These measures were self-reported on the survey. For the 
purpose of these analyses, any ANOVA with Political Identity will not include “No 
Party” participants because it is unclear what lead them to have no party. 
 Income Groups are sorted by the response to the comparative income 
scale item which asked the participant to rank their family’s income from 1 to 10 
relative to others. The correlation between the comparative income scale and the 
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average income scale which reports their income range is significant (r =0.767, 
p= 0.000, N= 227). The income groups are created based on collapsing across 
the ten comparative income groups to make four income groups (Lower Class: 
Comparative Income =1, Comparative Income =2, Comparative Income= 3; 
Lower Middle Class: Comparative Income =4, Comparative Income =5; Upper 
Middle Class: Comparative Income=6,Comparative Income =7; Upper Class: 
Comparative Income= 8, Comparative Income = 9, Comparative Income = 10). 
3.4 Analysis  
3.4.1 Calculations and Variables 
3.4.1.1 Delay Discounting 
The 27-item monetary choice questionnaire delay discounting rates were 
calculated using the 27-item MCQ auto-scorer public Excel workbook (Kaplan et. 
al, 2016). Using the scorer, each participant is given a small k (small time gap, 
small reward difference), medium k (medium time gap, medium reward 
difference), large k (large time gap, large reward difference)), and overall k 
(combination of all time and reward differences). This experiment reports all four 
delay discounting rates given by the auto-scorer because each level measures a 
different range of reward trade-off. The overall k rate is a participant’s overall 
rate, or a combination of the small, medium, and large trade-off decisions. By 
reporting all four rates, it can be observed if certain trade-off decisions are more 
affected by the future priming. Participants were excluded if their internal 
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consistency was below 75% (metric calculated by Kaplan auto-scorer public 
access Excel spread sheet).  
In this experiment we have two measurements of delay discounting. To 
collapse into one measurement, the delay discounting rate collected before the 
priming task was subtracted from the rate collected after the priming task. This 
difference measure is used because it corrects for individual differences in delay 
discounting and measures the pure difference within the subject. Using this 
difference gives us a change in delay discounting relative to each participant’s 
relative baseline delay discounting rates. This difference measure is calculated 
for all four levels of k. All measures of k are reported because they test different 
levels of temporal delay or reward size. Reporting the small, medium, and large 
delay discounting rates will reveal the trends of the overall delay discounting rate, 
as well as if a certain temporal sub-scale is more susceptible to priming.  
3.4.1.2 Normalized Negative Thought Ratios (NNR) 
The normalized negative thought ratios (NNR) were taken by subtracting 
the overall number negative thoughts from the overall number of positive and 
neutral thoughts and dividing by the total number of thoughts (Eq. 3.1). This ratio 
is calculated for the present and future priming response, creating two ratios per 
participants. Additionally, to ensure that the Future Valence captures the same 
metric as the NNR, a bivariate correlation between the two was completed. There 
is a high correlation between the averaged Future Valence score and the future 
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normalized negative thought ratio (r = -0.805, p = 0.000, n= 226). Due to this high 
correlation, both measurements should have similar results. 
Eq.		3.1:						ratio = #𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	–	(#𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	 + 	#𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙)#𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + #𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + #𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  
3.4.2 Future Perspective Scoring 
Each set of responses were scored by two separate undergraduate 
research assistants. The responses were first scored by counting the number of 
positive, neutral and negative phrases. Then, two separate research assistants 
read the responses and gave the response an Overall Valence score from 10 to -
10; with 10 being extremely optimistic and positive, and -10 being extremely 
pessimistic and negative. These valence scores were averaged for each prime in 
the priming task set. 
3.4.3 Analysis Plan 
In this analysis section, I will run three main analyses. The first is an 
analysis to test differences in future perspective and delay discounting rate 
before and after election groups (Section 3.5.2). This will test for any differences 
in purely the election group. In the other two analyses, I will test for differences 
within political identity and income group before and after the election. In my 
second, I will test for differences in future perspective and delay discounting rate 
across political identity by election group (Section 3.5.3). Finally, in my third 
analysis, I will test for differences in future perspective and delay discounting rate 
across income group by election group (Section 3.5.4). In each analysis, I will 
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begin with an ANOVA of Future Valence and future normalized negative thought 
ratios (NNR Future) followed by independent sample t-tests to test for differences 
within Political Identity and Income Group across the Election Group. This same 
analysis technique of an ANOVA followed by independent sample t-tests will be 
conducted for each level of delay discounting (overall, small, medium, and large).  
In all ANOVAs, Election Group, Income Group, and Political Identity are treated 
as fixed factors. I hypothesize that there will be differences across the Election 
Groups in all measures because the Midterm Election will have changed the 
participant’s decision-environment. I predict that differences in all measures will 
be observed, but that these differences will be more pronounced within specific 
Political Identities and Income Groups.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 2018 U.S. Midterm Election Political Results  
The 2018 U.S. Midterm Election broke a 50-year record (49% in 1966) for 
voter turnout, with levels of participation usually seen for Presidential Elections 
(NPR, accessed 5/20/2018). This Election had a turnout of 47.5%, up from 
36.7% in 2014 (NPR, 11/8/2018). Previous to this Election, the House of 
Representatives was comprised of majority Republicans (Democrats: 194, 
Republicans: 241) and the Senate was comprised of majority Republicans 
(Democrats: 48, Republicans: 52) (Associated Press, accessed 5/20/2018). After 
the Election, the House of Representatives went from a Republican majority to a 
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Democratic majority (Democrats: 235, Republicans: 199) (Associated Press, 
accessed 5/20/2018). 
This 41-seat pick-up in the House of Representatives caused a large 
change in the Unites States leadership infrastructure. Prior to election night, the 
odds of this pick up in House of Representatives and Senate was (7 in 8 and 1 in 
5, respectively) (FiveThirtyEight, last updated 11/6/2018 at 11:06am). The series 
of election victories triggered a change in House Leadership where Nancy Pelosi 
(D-CA) was named Speaker of the House and all HOR Committees became 
chaired by Democrats.  The Senate control was still maintained by the 
Republicans (Democrats: 47, Republicans: 53) (Associated Press, accessed 
5/20/2018) and the party leadership did not change, with Mitch McConnel (R-KY) 
remaining the Senate Majority Leader. In general, this set of elections is 
considered a win for Democrats because Republicans lost control of one house 
of Congress and no longer controlled both houses and the Presidency.  
3.5.2 Analysis by Election Group 
Before checking for differences in delay discounting across the Political 
Identities and Income Groups, I first wanted to look at the overall effect of 
Election Group on future environment perception and delay discounting.  To do 
this, I first tested for differences in Future Valence and NNR future across the two 
Election Groups using a one-way ANOVA with Election Group as the factor. 
Then I tested for differences in delay discounting across the Election Groups 
using the same one-way ANOVA with Election Group as the factor. 
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3.5.2.1 Differences in Future Perspective Across Election Group 
 
Figure 3.1 This figure shows differences in (a) Future Valence, (b) NNR Future, 
and (c) all four levels of delay discounting rates within Election Group. Error bars 
represent SEM for each condition and group.  
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To test for differences in future perspective, an ANOVA on Future Valence 
and NNR Future was completed. A one-way ANOVA of Election Group (Before 
Midterm, After Midterm) completed for Future Valence revealed a non-significant 
main effect of Election Group (F (1, 185) = 1.926, p= 0.0167, observed power = 
0.282). (Please see Figure 3.1a).   A one-way ANOVA of Election Group (Before 
Midterm, After Midterm) completed for NNR future revealed a non-significant 
main effect of Election Group (F (1, 185) = 2.534, p= 0.0113, observed power = 
0.353). Overall, there is a trend towards significance across these two groups, 
suggesting that a deeper analysis should be conducted to see if a certain group 
is driving this difference (Please see Figure 3.1b).  
3.5.2.2 Differences in Delay Discounting Across Election Group 
For overall k, there was no main effect of Election (F (1,186) =1.012, p= 
0.316, observed power = 0.170). For small k, there was no main effect of Election 
(F (1,186) =0.821, p= 0.366, observed power = 0.147). For medium k, there was 
no main effect of Election (F (1,186) =0.138, p= 0.710, observed power = 0.066). 
For large k, there was no main effect of Election (F (1,186) =1.435, p= 0.233, 
observed power = 0.222).  (Please see Figure 3.1c). 
Each of these analyses show that there are no Election Group differences 
for any level of delay discounting. However, this analysis does not show if there 
are differences within each Election Group that cancel each other out and result 
in a non-significant main effect. In order to test this, the analysis needs to be 
repeated to include the other identity factors which could result in Election 
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differences. These analyses should be repeated with an additional factor of 
Political Identity and Income Group to sparely test for differences based on the 
main effect of the identity factors and interactions between Election Group and 
the identity factors. 
3.5.3 Analysis by Political Identity and Election Group 
Next, I was interested in testing if there are differences across Political 
Party in the measurements taken before and after the election. To test for these 
differences, I first looked at the overall effect of Election Group on future 
environment perception and delay discounting within each Political Identity. To 
do this, I first tested for differences in Future Valence and NNR future across the 
three Political Identities and two Election Groups using a 2x3 ANOVA (Election 
Group: Before Midterm, After Midterm; Political Identity: Conservative, A Mix, 
Liberal). Then I tested for differences in delay discounting across the Election 
Groups using the same 2x3 ANOVA (Election Group: Before Midterm, After 
Midterm; Political Identity: Conservative, A Mix, Liberal). 
3.5.3.1 Differences in Future Perspective Across Political Identity by 
Election Group 
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Figure 3.2: This figure shows differences in (a)Future Valence, (b)NNR Future, 
and (c) all four levels of delay discounting rates within each Political Identity and 
by Election Group. Error bars represent SEM for each condition and group.  
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I first determined if the participants had different projections into the future 
based on their political identity by comparing the Future Valence score and the 
future NNR scores from the priming written responses across Election and 
Political identity groups. A 2x3 ANOVA (Election: Pre-Midterm, Post-Midterm; 
Political Identity: Liberal, A Mix of Both, Conservative) on Future Valence score 
showed a significant main effect of Election Group (F (1, 185) =9.654, p=0.002) 
and a significant interaction between Election Group and Political Identity (F (2, 
185) =4.175, p=0.017). The main effect of Political Identity was not significant (F 
(2, 185) =0.121, p=0.886).  This interaction between Election Group and Political 
identify shows that the means of Future Valence are different for each political 
identity and that these differences within each political party are also different 
across Election Group. To test what groups are driving this interaction, I must 
test for differences in Future Valence within each political identity across Election 
Group separately.  This analysis of Future Valence can be viewed in Figure 3.2a.  
To follow up on the interaction between Political Identity and Election 
group, I ran a series of independent samples t-tests to look at the difference in 
Future Valence before and after the 2018 Midterm Election within each Political 
Identity group. An independent samples t-test for the Conservatives confirmed a 
significant difference in their Future Valence before (M = 5.4) and after (M = -4.0) 
the election (t =4.354, df=7, p =0.003). These findings are not significant for the 
Mixed and Liberal participants. Mixed participants had no significant difference 
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between Pre- and Post-Midterm Future Valence (t= 1.267, df= 30, p= 0.215). 
Likewise, the Liberal participants showed no difference in the two measures 
(Future Valence: t =0.003, df= 121, p= 0.997). These comparisons show that 
Conservatives have the most significant difference in the valence of their 
thoughts before and after the Midterm Elections, for the future environment. 
Additionally, Conservatives changed from having a positive future perspective 
before the Midterm Elections to having a negative future perspective after the 
Midterm Elections. However, due to the very small Conservative sample size, 
more participants are needed before this statistic accepted with high certainty. 
Although, this drastic of a change in future perception did not occur for the other 
two parties.  
A similar analysis was performed using the normalized ratio of negative 
thoughts (NNR future) in the priming written responses This analysis was 
completed to test another metric of perception of future environment. A 2x3 
ANOVA (Midterm: Before Election, After Election; Political identity: Liberal, A Mix 
of Both, Conservative) on NNR future yielded a significant main effect of Election 
Group (F (1, 185) =3.937, p=0.049) but did not have a main effect of Political 
identity  (F (2, 185) =0.446 , p=0.641) or the interaction between Political identity  
and Election Group (F (2, 185) =0.882 , p= 0.416). This analysis reveals that the 
main effect of Election Group is still present in this second measure of future 
perspective, but that the main effect of Political Identity or the interaction between 
the who factors is not significant. Additionally, this effect of Election Group shows 
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that participants, overall, became more negative about the future after the 
election. Graphically, this effect seems to be heavily driven by the Conservatives’ 
mean.  This analysis can be viewed in Figure 3.2b. 
Overall, these results show that the Election Groups significantly differ in 
their perception of the future environment when Political Identity is included as a 
factor. There is also evidence of the Political Identities having different 
perceptions of the future environment, with the Conservatives driving this group 
effect of being more negative about the future environment after the Midterm 
Election. 
3.5.3.2 Differences in Delay Discounting Across Political Identity by 
Election Group 
In this next set of analyses, I have followed up on the finding that 
perception of the future is different between the Political Parties. I tested if this 
difference in future perspective coincides with changes from a participant’s delay 
discounting baseline rate after projecting into future. To do this, I tested if the 
difference in delay discounting from baseline and after self-projection across the 
Political Identity and Election groups. I tested differences at each temporal level 
of k to see which is the most susceptible to change from baseline after self-
projection.  I utilized a series of 2x3 ANOVAS (Election: Before Election, After 
Election; Political Identity: Conservative, A Mix, Liberal) on k difference were to 
test for differences in delay discounting across Political Party by Election Group. 
This ANOVA was run separately for each level of delay discounting.  
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The analysis of overall k revealed no main effect of Election 
(F(1,186)=0.506, p= 0.478, observed power = 0.109), Political Party ( 
F(2,186)=0.354, p= 0.702), observed power = 0.106) or the interaction 
(F(2,186)= 1.446 p= 0.238, observed power = 0.307)) between Election Group 
and Political Identity. The analysis for  small k revealed no main effect of Election 
(F(1,186)=0.139, p= 0.709, observed power = 0.233), Political Party ( 
F(2,186)=0.553, p= 0.576), observed power = 0.141) or the interaction 
(F(2,186)= 0.401 p= 0.670, observed power = 0.114)) between Election Group 
and Political Identity.. The analysis for medium k revealed, no main effect of 
Election (F (1,186) =0.077, p= 0.781, observed power = 0.059), Political Party (F 
(2,186) =0.174, p= 0.840), observed power = 0.077). However, a trend for a 
significant interaction between Election Group and Political Identity was observed 
(F (2,186) = 2.494 p= 0.085, observed power = 0.496).  Finally, the analysis for 
large k revealed no main effect of Election (F(1,186)=0.321, p= 0.571, observed 
power = 0.110), Political Party ( F(2,186)=0.089, p= 0.915), observed power = 
0.063) or the interaction (F(2,186)= 0.428, p= 0.652, observed power = 0.119)) 
between Election Group and Political Identity. Overall, there is only evidence for 
the presence of an interaction between Election Group and Political Identity 
within the medium k domain. The graphs of these analyses for each delay 
discounting rate can be found in Figure 3.2c.   
Next, the question is if specific Political Identities have differences in delay 
discounting after self-projection before and after the election. To investigate if 
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there are differences before and after the election within each political identity, I 
ran a series of independent t-tests. These t-tests were conducted for each level 
of delay discounting. These independent t-tests revealed that the conservatives 
did not show any significant differences across overall k (df= 7, t=0.266, p= 
0.927), small k (df= 7, t=0.073, p= 0.729). medium k (df= 7, t=0.474, p= 0.650), 
or large k (df= 7, t= -0.582, p= 0.579). As well as the liberals who also did not 
show any significant differences across overall k (df= 120, t= -0.106, p= 0.916), 
small k (df= 56.784, t=0.316, p= 0.753). medium k (df= 51.784, t= -1.180, p= 
0.243), or large k (df= 120, t= 0.550, p= 0.584). However these independent t-
tests revealed that the mixed identity showed significant differences across 
overall k (df= 36.208, t=2.300, p= 0.027) and medium k (df= 50.171, t=0.2.684 , 
p= 0.010), but did not show difference for small k (df= 40.059, t=1.359, p= 0.182 
or large k (df= 37.968, t= 1.833 , p= 0.075). Overall, this provides evidence for 
the Mix identity’s chance in delay discounting rates being the most affected by 
the Election, with a specific change in overall and medium k domains but not 
small and large k domains.   
3.5.4 Analysis by Income Group and Election Group 
Next, I was interested in testing if there are differences across Income 
Group in the measurements taken before and after the election. To test for these 
differences, I first looked at the overall effect of Election Group on future 
environment perception and delay discounting within each Income Group. To do 
this, I first tested for differences in Future Valence and NNR future across the 
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four Income Groups and two Election Groups using a 2x4 ANOVA (Election 
Group: Before Midterm, After Midterm; Income Group:  Lower Class, Lower 
Middle Class, Upper Middle Class, Upper Class). Then I tested for differences in 
delay discounting across the Election Groups using the same 2x4 ANOVA 
(Election Group: Before Midterm, After Midterm; Income Group:  Lower Class, 
Lower Middle Class, Upper Middle Class, Upper Class). 
3.5.4.1 Differences in Future Perspective Across Income Group by Election 
Group 
Next, I was interested in seeing if these changes in future perspectives 
based on election outcomes are also found across the income levels. To do this, 
I repeated the analysis comparing the Future Valence and NNR future scores 
across Income groups and Before and After the elections. First to test if the 
Future Valence is different across the Income Groups, a 2x4 ANOVA (Election 
Group: Pre-Midterm, Post-Midterm; Income Group: Lower Class, Lower Middle 
Class, Upper Middle Class, Upper Class) on was completed. This ANOVA did 
not show a significant main effect of Election Group (F (1,226) = 1.613, p=0.205), 
Income Group (F (3,226) =1.389, p=0.247), or an interaction between Election 
Group and Income Group (F (3,226) =1.197, p=0.312). This demonstrates that 
there is no difference in Future Valence Before and After the election, as well as 
across the Income Groups. However, it is still important to check if there are 
differences in Future Valence within each Income Group separately.  Please see 
Figure 3.3a for results of this analysis. 
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Figure 3.3: This figure shows differences in (a)Future Valence, (b)NNR Future, 
and (c) all four levels of delay discounting rates within each Income Group and 
by Election Group. Error bars represent SEM for each condition and group.  
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To test if there is a difference within Income Group, as there was with 
Political Identity, I completed a series of independent samples t-tests to look at 
the difference in Future Valence before and after the 2018 Midterm Election. An 
independent samples t-test for the Upper Class confirmed a significant difference 
in their Future Valence before (M = 4.357, SD = 1.193) and after (M = 1.370, 
SD=0.859) the election (t = 2.031, df=39, p =0.049). These findings are not 
significant for the Lower Class, Lower Middle Class and Upper Middle-Class 
participants. Lower Class participants had no significant difference in Future 
Valence before and after the election (t= 0.032, df= 31, p= 0.975). Likewise, the 
Lower Middle-Class participants showed no difference in Future Valence (t = 
1.067, df= 55, p= 0.291). As well as, Upper Middle Class which showed no 
difference in Future Valence (t = -0.502, df= 93, p= 0.617).These comparisons 
show that the Upper Class  is the only Income Group to have a significant 
difference in the valence of their thoughts about the future environment before 
and after the Midterm Elections. This group has a more negative projection of the 
future after the Midterm Election than the projection before the election. 
To test if NNR showed any changes across the election by income group, 
a 2x4 ANOVA (Election: Pre-Midterm, Post-Midterm; Income Group: Lower 
Class, Lower-Middle Class, Upper-Middle-Class, Upper Class) on NNR future 
was completed. The ANOVA on future NNR has a marginally significant main 
effect of Election Group (F(1,227)=2.121, p=0.098), but does not have a 
significant main effect of Election Group (F(1,226)=1.716, p=0.192) or an 
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interaction between Election Group and Income Group (F(3,226)=1.861, 
p=0.137). This again shows that there is a difference in the contents of future 
projection between the two election groups, with the after-election projection 
being more negative than the before election projection. Please see Figure 3.3b 
for results of this analysis. 
Overall, these results show that the Income Groups do significantly differ 
in their perception of the future environment. There is also evidence of the 
Income Groups having different perceptions of the future environment with the 
Upper Class driving the group effect.  
3.5.4.2 Differences in Delay Discounting Across Income Group by 
Election Group 
In this next set of analyses, I am testing if Income groups have differences 
in their delay discounting before and after the 2018 Midterm Election. To do this, 
I will first test if the difference of the after projection and baseline delay 
discounting rates is different before and after the 2018 Midterm Election for each 
income group. If differences are revealed, I will run a set of One-Way ANOVA of 
difference in delay discounting as a dependent variable and Election group as a 
factor separately for each Income Group.  I will follow up any differences 
between Election groups will a series of paired t-tests. Finally, I will run Mixed 
ANOVAs on any Income Groups that are significant in the paired t-tests. 
The analysis of overall k revealed there was no main effect of Election (F 
(1,226) =1.148, p= 0.285, observed power = 0.187). Although there was a 
 71 
marginally significant main effect Income Group (F (3,226) =2.538, p= 0.058), 
observed power = 0.621) and an interaction between Income Group and Election 
Group (F (3, 226)= 2.57 p= 0.055, observed power = 0.627). The analysis of 
small k revealed there was no main effect of Election (F (1,226) =0.712, p= 
0.400, observed power = 0.134). However again, there is a significant main effect 
of Income Group (F (3,226) =3.389, p= 0.019, observed power = 0.760) and an 
interaction between Election Group and Income Group (F (3, 226)= 3.661 p= 
0.013, observed power = 0.795). A similar result was observed for medium k, 
with no main effect of Election (F (1,226) =0.618, p= 0.433, observed power = 
0.123) but  a marginally significant main effect of Income Group (F (3,226) 
=2.313, p= 0.077), observed power = 0.577) and significant interaction between 
Election Group and Income Group (F(3, 226)= 4.799 p= 0.003, observed power = 
0.899) as well. 
Finally, in large k, there was a marginally significant main effect of Election 
(F (1,226) =2.658, p= 0.104, observed power = 0.368) and a significant 
interaction between Income Group and Election Group (F (3, 226)= 3.033 p= 
0.013, observed power = 0.796)). However, the main effect of Income Group (F 
(3,226) =1.011, p= 0.389), observed power = 0.273) was not significant.  This 
repeated interaction of Election Group and Income group across all levels of k 
shows that there are significantly different changes in delay discounting rate from 
the participant’s baseline. This mean difference in k is different for each Income 
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Group, a well as within each Income Group across Election Group. Please see 
Figure 3.3c for results of this analysis.  
Next, the question is if specific Income Groups have differences in delay 
discounting after self-projection before and after the election. To investigate if 
there are differences before and after the election within each Income Group, I 
ran a series of independent t-tests. These t-tests were conducted for each level 
of delay discounting. The independent t-tests revealed that the upper middle and 
upper classes were more affected than the lower and lower middle classes.  
Specifically, the lower class did not show any significant differences 
across overall k (df= 30.025, t= -0.929, p= 0.360), small k (df= 31, t= -1.152, p= 
0.258). medium k (df= 30.939, t= -0.167, p= 0.868), or large k (df= 30.668, t= -
0.176, p= 0.861). The same pattern was present in the lower middle class who 
did not show any significant differences across overall k (df= 55, t=0.503, p= 
0.617), small k (df= 55, t= -0.212, p= 0.833). medium k (df= 55, t=0.639, p= 
0.526), or large k (df=55, t= -0.159, p= 0.874). However, the upper middle class 
showed a significant difference across medium k (df= 93, t= -2.47, p= 0.015) but 
did not show difference for overall k (df= 93, t= -0.813 , p= 0.419), small k (df= 
93, t= -0.362, p= 0.718 or large k (df= 93, t= -0.425 , p= 0.672). This pattern 
increased in the upper class who showed significant differences across overall k 
(df= 39, t=2479, p= 0.018), small k (df= 39, t=2.560 , p= 0.014), medium k (df= 
39, t=2.482, p= 0.017 and large k (df= 39, t= 2.482 , p= 0.017).  Overall, these 
analyses reveal that the Income Groups show a significant difference in their 
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Baseline and After projection delay discounting measurements. The effect of 
Election Group is most strongly observed in the Upper Income Group, which was 
predicted by my hypothesis. 
3.6 Discussion 
Overall, this experiment showed that a major socio-political event can 
change one’s future perspectives and delay discounting rate. Additionally, it was 
shown that both the degree of change in future perception and delay discounting 
before and after the election is influenced by one’s political identity and 
socioeconomic status. Future Valence was significantly different between the 
election groups for Conservative and Upper-Class participants, with 
Conservatives showing a 10-point decrease in their mean Future Valence after 
the election. Both groups became significantly more negative after the election, 
compared to before the midterm.  
Delay discounting was significantly different between election groups for 
the Mixed political identity and Upper-Class income group. These two groups 
showed the most change from baseline in their delay discounting rates, with the 
Mix participants becoming less myopic after the election and Upper-Class 
participants becoming more myopic. While the relationship between higher 
Future Valence and increased myopic choices was not observed in 
Conservatives, this pattern was observed in Upper Class group. These results 
show evidence of future perspective influencing differences in delay discounting, 
such that if a participant is more concerned about future, more myopic options 
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will be chosen. This pattern of behavior replicates foraging, and hording 
behaviors documented in the Incentive Hope Hypothesis and the resource 
scarcity and decision-making literature. 
There are two short comings of this experiment: (a) the different cohorts, 
which could be causing cohort effects, and (b) the very low number of enrolled 
conservatives. The cohort effect is an un-avoidable short coming when the 
experimental design involves collecting data from two different groups. I chose 
the experimental design with full acknowledgment of this short coming, because 
this survey involved the same monetary choice questionnaire and it was believed 
that a participant seeing the same survey four times would be more of a 
confound than testing two separate groups.  
The other shortcoming of this experiment is the low number of enrolled 
Conservative participants (N=9). Historically, the political identity breakdown of 
U.S. voters is Republican: 30%, Democrat: 30%, Independent: 40% (Gallop 
Historical Trends, Accessed June 2019). Since I did not specifically recruit any 
political parties, there is a very low number of Conservatives. This may be a 
natural phenomenon due to Amherst, MA’s historical political leanings as 
dominantly liberal, or participant’s choice to not label themselves as conservative 
due to their conscious knowledge that they are in the political minority. 
Additionally, there has been an efflux of Conservatives leaving the Republican 
Party over the last two years (The Washington Post, 1/8/2018). If participants are 
reading Conservative as synonymous with the Republican Party, they may be 
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choosing not to identify as Conservative if they have recently left the Republican 
Party. The sample is also limited to participants who reside in Massachusetts 
(either as students or residents), which is a traditionally very liberal and 
progressive state.  
In the 2020 election follow-up and my replication of this experiment in Fall 
2019, I plan to reach out to conservative and Republican groups on campus such 
as the Young Republicans Club and majors that are historically conservative 
such as Finance, Economics, Political Science, and Legal Studies to recruit a 
larger conservative cohort.
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARDS 
  
4.1 Summary of the Two Experimental Outcomes 
Together, these two experiments show that (1) delay discounting can be 
influenced by framing and the influence of framing differs across countries with 
very different decision environments, and (2) within a country after a major 
sociopolitical event. Collectively, these results collectively demonstrate different 
decision environments correspond to changes in delay discounting rates. These 
differences can be induced by framing choices to be in different temporal 
domains or by having a participant project themselves into the future and imagine 
the world in 10 years. In the remainder of this section, I will briefly recap the 
results of each experiment. In the next section I discuss the neuro-biological 
mechanisms of delay discounting as well as potential future directions for 
neurobiological experiments that examine the role of future projection and 
temporal framing on delay discounting.  
The first experiment demonstrated that temporal framing of gains and 
losses has a stronger effect on Chinese participants than American participants. 
Specifically, Chinese participants had higher delay discounting within the Present 
Gain (choosing smaller rewards in the present more than larger rewards in the 
future) and Future Loss conditions (choosing to pay smaller fines in the present 
more than larger fines in the future). In the Gain domain, the Chinese groups had 
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with greater difference between their Present Gain and Future Gain discounting 
rates than the American Present Gain and Future Gain conditions, showing that 
Chinese participants were more sensitive to temporal framing than American 
participants.  In the Loss domain, the difference between present and future 
framing was smaller in both the Chinese and American participants. The Chinese 
participants maintained a larger delay discounting difference between Present 
Loss and Future Loss conditions, than the American participants.  
The second experiment showed that delay discounting changes from 
baseline before and after a major socio-political event, and that delay discounting 
becomes more implusive in groups with more pessimistic future projections. The 
directionality of the difference from baseline differed across income groups and 
political identity. Specifically, the change in delay discounting rate before and 
after the 2018 Midterm Election revealed within-subject differences in delay 
discounting rates for participants with “A Mix of Liberal and Conservative” political 
identity and the Upper-Class income group. Overall, these behavioral findings 
suggest that the direction of delay discounting difference changes before and 
after a major election and specifically within certain political identities and income 
groups. The overall pattern of pessimistic future projections resulting in 
participants choosing a higher proportion of short-term choices is in line with 
literature on decision-making under resource scarcity.  These results collectively 
demonstrate that differences in decision environments can cause different 
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projections towards the future as well as the future-related choices reflected in 
delay discounting. 
 
4. 2 Neurobiology of Delay Discounting  
 
This thesis thus far, has provided a significant amount of information about 
the cognitive psychology of delay discounting. Most of the evidence presented 
has been economic theories, behavioral tasks, or neuro-imaging studies. In this 
section, I will provide a deeper explanation of the neurobiology of delay 
discounting. Then I will propose future experiments that combine the behavioral 
paradigms I piloted in this thesis with neurobiological measurements to directly 
test how future uncertainty affects the delay discounting neural mechanism.  
Dopamine neurons are the primary actors in neuronal reward research. 
Midbrain dopamine neurons have been found to respond to motivation, act as a 
positive reinforcer after behavioral decisions, and encode reward expectation 
errors to show the clear link between reward in learning and decision making 
(Satosh et. al, 2003). These dopamine neurons can also change their activity 
based on their receptor topography. A specific class of dopamine receptor have 
been linked to impulsive decision making in delay discounting tasks.  
The ventral tegmental area (VTA) D2 receptors have been shown to 
increase delay discounting impulsivity after a viral knockdown was administered 
in rats. After receiving the viral knockdown, the rats’ delay discounting curves 
shifted to the left showing that they started to prefer smaller, immediate rewards 
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over larger, future rewards. This demonstrated evidence that a decrease in VTA 
D2 receptors enhances reward impulsivity (Bernosky- Smith et. al, 2017). The 
same class of D2 neurons in the nucleus accumbens shell have also been 
associated with implusive choice behavior (Barlow et. al, 2018).    
Dynamic and dissociable fluctuations of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and nucleus accumbens (NAc) has been associated with the PFC signals 
changes in reward availability while the NAc encodes integrated signals about 
reward rates, uncertainty, and choice (Onge et. al, 2012). In participants planning 
to undergo deep brain stimulation surgery, microelectrode recordings were 
performed to target NAc neurons during a financial decision-making task. The 
recordings found that NAc activity predicted future financial decisions on a trial by 
trial basis (Patel et. al, 2013).   
On a higher circuit level, it is important to investigate the brain areas 
involved in economic and reward-based decision making (for a review of all brain 
structures and their correlated responses, see Doya, 2008). In terms of risk 
processing, the anterior insular cortex (AIC) and orbital frontal cortex (OFC) are 
shown to convey signals about reward uncertainty. The OFC is thought to be 
encoding certain reward biased, risk modulated value, while the AIC may convey 
prolonged negative outcome and disappointment signals (Jo & Jung, 2016).  
Using transcranial magnetic stimulation, a participant’s medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) was activated during a delay discounting task. The participant’s 
performance was then compared to the participant’s delay discounting task 
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performance to a control trial. The comparison showed that high frequency 
transcranial magnetic stimulation of the mPFC showed a decrease in a 
participant’s delay discounting rate, but this decrease was not associated with a 
transcranial magnetic stimulated release of dopamine in the NAc (Cho et. al, 
2015). This finding suggests that the mPFC provides an inhibitory control over 
delay discounting that allows a participant to choose more options in the future. A 
similar effect was not observed when excess dopamine, assumed to make the 
participant more reward-sensitive, was released.  The specific neural 
mechanisms were mapped using fMRI (McClure et. al, 2004; Ballard & Knutson, 
2009).  
First, McClure et. al, located the brain regions that respond as the “beta 
system” and “delta system”. The beta/delta system refers to a two-component 
model of delay discounting calculations where the beta system weighs the 
immediate reward, and the delta system weights the future reward (Laibson 
1997). While in the fMRI participants chose between a present reward or a 
reward in the future. Analysis grouped all decisions where the participant chose 
the present reward as the beta circuit, and all decisions where the participant 
chose the future reward as the delta circuit. The analysis of beta choices 
revealed activation in the ventral striatum, medial orbitofrontal cortex, medial 
prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex. The analysis of the delta choices 
revealed activation in sensory and motor processing areas, as well as dorsal 
lateral pre-frontal cortex, ventral lateral pre-frontal cortex, and the lateral 
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orbitofrontal cortex. The relative activation of the two neural groups predict 
intertemporal choice within participants, such that participants with higher beta 
activation prefer the present reward and participants with higher delta activation 
prefer the delayed reward.  
A follow-up study with the goal of disentangling activations due to reward 
magnitude and delay length prior to the participants’ choice was completed by 
Ballard and Knutson in 2009.  While in an fMRI, participants completed a 
monetary choice questionnaire with information presented in a staggered 
fashion. This staggering allowed activation due to delay and reward magnitude 
could be analyzed separately. The analysis revealed that the participants showed 
different activation patterns in reward magnitude and reward delay, as well as 
different activations based on impulsivity traits. This study replicated that the 
medial prefrontal cortex, nucleus accumbens, and posterior parietal cingulate 
cortex showed increased activation to reward magnitude. While the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex showed decreased activation to 
delay length. Within subject, it was shown that participants with higher impulsivity 
showed reduced nucleus accumbens activation towards future rewards and 
reduced deactivations of the medial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and the posterior parietal cortex. Overall, this study shows neural 
evidence of separate processing of reward magnitude and delay length, as well 
as how individual differences can influence activations and these regions which 
result in changes of delay discounting choices.  
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Building on previous imaging studies of the neural mechanism of the 
discounting of future gains, Xu et. al, 2008 integrated the neural mechanism of 
the discounting of future gains and losses. Using a gain and loss discounting 
task, the researchers’ analysis revealed that the lateral PFC and posterior 
parietal areas were active in both gain and loss discounting trials, with activations 
higher during loss trials. They also found evidence for negative emotion 
contributing to loss sensitivity due to increased activation of the insula, thalamus, 
and dorsal stratum during loss trials. Together, this replicates evidence that the 
fronto-parietal network is involved in discounting of gains and losses and adding 
the documented existence of an asymmetry of gains and losses occurring in the 
neural activation patterns. 
Overall, these imaging studies provide ample evidence of a neural 
mechanism of delay discounting. This mechanism has been shown to respond to 
gains and losses differently, with evidence of the asymmetry of gains and losses 
existing on a neuronal level. Since our findings are related to differences in 
decision environment, the next steps would be to test the activations of this 
neural circuit under a resource scarcity manipulation or an uncertain environment 
gambling task. These tasks could be used to replicate differences found across 
economic environments or after a large-scale socio-economic event within the 
scanner. These paradigms would test if our current behavioral findings result in 
observable neurobiological differences in the neural mechanism.  
 
 83 
4.3 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions 
 
Collectively, these two experiments provide evidence that decision 
environment and perception of the future significantly impacts intertemporal 
choice. The first experiment replicated differences in delay discounting between 
the U.S. and China in the present gain condition as well as provided evidence 
that Chinese participants become less impulsive in both gains and losses when 
their intertemporal choices are framed in the future. These differences in delay 
discounting across temporal frame and country remaining significant after 
controlling for the cultural and personality differences between the groups. This 
experiment shows the vital role of environment in intertemporal decision-making, 
and how different decision environments have different responses to temporal 
framing and anchoring.  
 The second experiment showed how perception of future perspective and 
delay discounting can change before and after a major socio-political, and how 
these changes are specifically observed within specific identities. Understanding 
how changes due to socio-political landscape effect future perspective and 
intertemporal choice is vital to understanding humans navigate complex 
economic and social environments fraught with random (e.g., economic crises) 
and non-random (e.g., political administration changes) large-scale events. As 
well as how these events affect feelings of uncertainty that may create social 
responses like nationalism and in-group bias.  
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Overall, these to experiments add to the literature on how decision-
environment and resource scarcity influence intertemporal decision making. 
Future research will investigate how activations in the beta-delta circuitry change 
with uncertainty information or information about the contents of the future 
decision environment. Further investigations of these behavioral patterns and the 
underlying neural circuitry will enable us to better understand how humans act 
within and respond to changes in their environments, as well as how the effects 
resource scarcity and future perception of uncertainty can be mitigated to lessen 
myopic decision-making.
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APPENDIX A 
 
 CHOICE TITRATION ITEMS 
 
Version 1 (Gift Card, Present Framing) 
1. Would you prefer $50 today or $40 in three months?  
2. Would you prefer $50 today or $45 in three months? 
3. Would you prefer $50 today or $50 in three months?  
4. Would you prefer $50 today or $55 in three months?  
5. Would you prefer $50 today or $60 in three months?  
6. Would you prefer $50 today or $65 in three months?  
7. Would you prefer $50 today or $70 in three months?  
8. Would you prefer $50 today or $75 in three months?  
9. Would you prefer $50 today or $80 in three months? 
10. Would you prefer $50 today or $85 in three months?  
11. Would you prefer $50 today or $90 in three months?  
 
Version 2 (Gift Card, Future Framing) 
1. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $35 today?  
2. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $40 today?  
3. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $45 today?  
4. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $50 today?  
5. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $55 today?  
6. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $60 today?  
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7. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $65 today?  
8. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $70 today?  
9. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $75 today?  
10. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $80 today?  
11. Would you prefer $75 three months from today, or $85 today?  
 
Version 3 (Fine, Present Framing) 
1. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $90 fine 3 months from today?  
2. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $85 fine 3 months from today?  
3. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $80 fine 3 months from today?  
4. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $75 fine 3 months from today?  
5. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $70 fine 3 months from today?  
6. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $65 fine 3 months from today?  
7. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $60 fine 3 months from today?  
8. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $55 fine 3 months from today?  
9. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $50 fine 3 months from today?  
10. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $45 fine 3 months from today? 
11. Would you prefer $50 fine today, or $40 fine 3 months from today? 
 
Version 4 (Fine, Future Framing) 
1. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $85 fine today? 
2. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $80 fine today?  
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3. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $75 fine today? 
4. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $70 fine today?  
5. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $65 fine today?  
6. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $60 fine today?  
7. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $55 fine today?  
8. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $50 fine today?  
9. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $45 fine today?  
10. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $40 fine today?  
11. Would you prefer $75 fine 3 months from today, or $35 fine today? 
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APPENDIX B 
2018 MIDTERM ELECTION SURVEY 
Demographics: 
1) Age: 
2) Gender: 
3) Zip Code: 
4) Highest Personal Educational Milestone Achieved: 
5) Employed? 
6) What is your housing situation? 
7) Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year? 
8) Has someone in your immediate family been the victim of a crime during the 
last year? 
9) In what group is your household? Please consider all wages, salaries, 
pensions, benefits, and other incomes that come in when specifying the 
appropriate number. 
10) Income is measured via a scale from 1 (lowest income group) to 10 (highest 
income group). Please give a number between 1 and 10.  
11) How interested would you say you are in politics?  
a) Very interested  
b) Somewhat interested  
c) Not very interested  
d) Not at all interested  
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12) Over the last five years, how do you think your interest in politics has 
changed?  
a) Much less interested than 5 years ago  
b) Less interested than 5 years ago  
c) The same interest level as 5 years ago  
d) More interested than 5 years ago  
e) Much more interested than 5 years ago  
13) How would you rate yourself politically?  
a) Very Conservative  
b) Conservative  
c) A mix of conservative and liberal  
d) Liberal  
e) Very Liberal  
f) My views align with a different political identity  
g) I do not have a set political identity  
MQC (27Q)  
Answer quickly and honestly. 
1) Would you prefer $ 54 today, Or $ 55 in 117 days? 
2) Would you prefer $ 55 today, or $ 75 in 61 days?  
3) Would you prefer $ 19 today, or $ 25 in 53 days?  
4) Would you prefer $ 31 today, or $ 85 in 7 days?  
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5) Would you prefer $ 14 today, or $ 25 in 19 days?  
6) Would you prefer $ 47 today, or $ 50 in 160 days?  
7) Would you prefer $ 15 today, or $ 35 in 13 days?  
8) Would you prefer $ 25 today, or $ 60 in 14 days? 
9) Would you prefer $ 78 today, or $ 80 in 162 days?  
10) Would you prefer $ 40 today, or $ 55 in 62 days?  
11) Would you prefer $ 11 today, or $ 30 in 7 days?  
12) Would you prefer $ 67 today, or $ 75 in 119 days?  
13) Would you prefer $ 34 today, or $ 35 in 186 days? 
14) Would you prefer $ 27 today, or $ 50 in 21 days? 
15) Would you prefer $ 69 today, or $ 85 in 91 days? 
16) Would you prefer $ 49 today, or $ 60 in 89 days?  
17) Would you prefer $ 80 today, or $ 85 in 157 days? 
18) Would you prefer $ 24 today, or $ 35 in 29 days?  
19) Would you prefer $ 33 today, or $ 80 in 14 days?  
20) Would you prefer $ 28 today, or $ 30 in 179 days? 
21) Would you prefer $ 34 today, or $ 50 in 30 days?  
22) Would you prefer $ 25 today, or $ 30 in 80 days?  
23) Would you prefer $ 41 today, or $ 75 in 20 days?  
24) Would you prefer $ 54 today, or $ 60 in 111 days?  
25) Would you prefer $ 54 today, or $ 80 in 30 days?  
26) Would you prefer $ 22 today, or $ 25 in 136 days?  
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27) Would you prefer $ 20 today, or $ 55 in 7 days?  
BIS-11 (30Q)  
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. 
This is a test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read 
each statement and put an X on the appropriate circle on the right side of this 
page. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and 
honestly.  
1= Rarely/Never 2= Occasionally 3= Often 4= Almost Always/Always  
1) I plan tasks carefully. 
2) I do things without thinking.  
3) I make-up my mind quickly. 
4) I am happy-go-lucky. 
5) I don’t “pay attention.” 
6) I have “racing” thoughts.  
7) I plan trips well ahead of time. 
8) I am self-controlled 
9) I concentrate easily. 
10) I save regularly.  
11) I “squirm” at plays or lectures. 
12) I am a careful thinker. 
13) I plan for job security. 
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14) I say things without thinking. 
15) I like to think about complex problems.  
16) I change jobs.  
17) I act “on impulse.” 
18) I get easily bored when solving thought problems.  
19) I act on the spur of the moment. 
20) I am a steady thinker. 
21) I change residences. 
22) I buy things on impulse. 
23) I can only think about one thing at a time.  
24) I change hobbies. 
25) I spend or charge more than I earn. 
26) I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking. 
27) I am more interested in the present than the future.  
28) I am restless at the theater or lectures. 
29) I like puzzles. 
30) I am future oriented.  
Considerations of Future Consequences (12 Q)  
Answer quickly and honestly.  
1=extremely uncharacteristic, 2=somewhat uncharacteristic, 3=uncertain, 
4=somewhat characteristic, 5=extremely characteristic  
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1) I consider how things might be in the future and try to influence those things 
with my day to day behavior.  
2) Often, I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that 
may not result for many years.  
3) I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of 
itself. 
4) My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or 
weeks) outcomes of my actions. 
5) My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take. 
6) I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to 
achieve future outcomes.  
7) I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously 
even if the negative outcome will not occur for many years.  
8) I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant 
consequences than a behavior with less-important immediate consequences.  
9) I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think 
the problems will be resolved before they reach crisis level.  
10) I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can 
be dealt with at a later time.  
11) I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future 
problems that may occur at a later date.  
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12) Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me 
than behavior that has distant outcomes.  
PEW Questions (14Q)  
1) How do you feel about the speed the world is changing around you compared 
to 5 year ago?  
a) Slower compared to 5 years ago  
b) The same speed as 5 years ago  
c) Faster compared to 5 years ago  
i) If you answered “slower” above, how much slower is it changing? 
________ times slower (put a number between 1 to 100)  
ii) If you answered “faster” above, how much faster is it changing? 
________ times faster (put a number between 1 to 100)  
2)  In which direction do you feel the world has to changed compared to 5 years 
ago?  
a) Very negative compared to 5 years ago  
b) Negative compared to 5 years ago  
c) About the same compared to 5 years ago  
d)  Positive compared to 5 years ago  
e) Very positive compared to 5 years ago  
3)   I see myself as a world citizen.  
a) None of the time  
b) Some of the time  
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c) Most of the time  
d) All of the time  
4)  I see myself as part of my local community.  
a)  None of the time  
b) Some of the time  
c) Most of the time  
d) All of the time  
5) I see myself as an autonomous individual.   
a) None of the time  
b) Some of the time  
c) Most of the time  
d) All of the time  
6)  How do you feel about the actions of world leaders? (Global) ____  
a) I am very dissatisfied  
b) I am dissatisfied  
c) I am slightly dissatisfied  
d) I do not have an opinion  
e) I am slightly satisfied  
f) I am satisfied  
g) I am very satisfied  
7)  How safe would you feel visiting various countries around the world? (Global) 
____  
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a) I would not feel safe at all,  
b) I would feel slightly unsafe  
c) I do not know  
d) I would feel slightly safe  
e) I would feel completely safe  
8)  How do you feel about the level government effort to keep you safe from 
harm? (Local)  
a) I am very dissatisfied  
b) I am dissatisfied  
c) I am slightly dissatisfied  
d) I do not have an opinion  
e) I am slightly satisfied  
f) I am satisfied  
g) I am very satisfied  
9)  Generally speaking, tell us for each group the degree in which you trust that 
group: completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all. 
a) Your family 
b) Your neighborhood 
c) People you know personally 
d) People you meet for the first time 
e) People of another religion 
f) People of another nationality 
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10) How concerned are you about the following issues?  
a) The economy in general  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned 
b) Your own economic situation  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
c) Your retirement pension  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
d) Your health  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
e) Environmental protection  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
f) The impacts of climate change  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
g) Maintaining peace  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
h) Crime in the United States  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
i) Social unification in society  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
j) Immigration to the United States  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
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k) Hostility towards foreigners or 
minorities in the United States  
i) Very concerned  
ii) Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned  
iv) Fairly not concerned  
v) Not concerned  
l) Your job security.  
i) Very concerned 
ii)  Fairly concerned  
iii) Somewhat concerned 
iv)  Fairly not concerned 
v)  Not concerned  
 
11) If you were to look for a relatively well-paying job or enter the job market in 
the near future, how do you feel about entering the current economy? (Local)  
a) I am very pessimistic  
b) I am slightly pessimistic  
c) I have a neutral view  
d) I am slightly optimistic  
e) I am very optimistic  
Open Response Questions:  
We’re using these essays to generate ideas about how people think and perceive 
the future. Please write between 3 and 6 sentences about the following 
questions. Your essay will be used for creating future studies and having an 
essay of good quality will enter you to win an $100 Amazon gift card.  
1) How is your day and week going so far? What are some events that have 
happened in your life? 
2) Imagine you were able to experience the world as it will be 10 years from 
now. How would you describe the world you see in your own words? How do 
you see yourself within your society taking into account the changes in 
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environmental, economic, or political and technological climate? What 
changes do you expect in the future given what you know about the world 
now? How positive or negative do you expect these changes to the world to 
be?  
 (Repeat) MQC (27Q)   
Answer quickly and honestly. 
1) Would you prefer $ 54 today, Or $ 55 in 117 days?  
2) Would you prefer $ 55 today, or $ 75 in 61 days?  
3) Would you prefer $ 19 today, or $ 25 in 53 days?  
4) Would you prefer $ 31 today, or $ 85 in 7 days?  
5) Would you prefer $ 14 today, or $ 25 in 19 days?  
6) Would you prefer $ 47 today, or $ 50 in 160 days?  
7) Would you prefer $ 15 today, or $ 35 in 13 days? 
8) Would you prefer $ 25 today, or $ 60 in 14 days?  
9) Would you prefer $ 78 today, or $ 80 in 162 days?  
10) Would you prefer $ 40 today, or $ 55 in 62 days?  
11) Would you prefer $ 11 today, or $ 30 in 7 days?  
12) Would you prefer $ 67 today, or $ 75 in 119 days?  
13) Would you prefer $ 34 today, or $ 35 in 186 days?  
14) Would you prefer $ 27 today, or $ 50 in 21 days?  
15) Would you prefer $ 69 today, or $ 85 in 91 days?  
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16) Would you prefer $ 49 today, or $ 60 in 89 days?  
17) Would you prefer $ 80 today, or $ 85 in 157 days?  
18) Would you prefer $ 24 today, or $ 35 in 29 days?  
19) Would you prefer $ 33 today, or $ 80 in 14 days?  
20) Would you prefer $ 28 today, or $ 30 in 179 days?  
21) Would you prefer $ 34 today, or $ 50 in 30 days?  
22) Would you prefer $ 25 today, or $ 30 in 80 days?  
23) Would you prefer $ 41 today, or $ 75 in 20 days?  
24) Would you prefer $ 54 today, or $ 60 in 111 days?  
25) Would you prefer $ 54 today, or $ 80 in 30 days?  
26) Would you prefer $ 22 today, or $ 25 in 136 days?  
27) Would you prefer $ 20 today, or $ 55 in 7 days?  
Allocation Task: Imagine that you had just unexpectedly received $1,000 and 
were asked to allocate it among four options. Which option would you 
choose?  
a) Use it to buy something nice for someone special  
b) Invest it in a retirement fund  
c) Plan a fun and extravagant occasion  
d) Put it into a checking account  
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